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CHAPTER I
In troduction
The rap id  growth and acceptance o f  Euro-dollars  as a new modality  fo r  
in te rn a t io n a l  c a p ita l  movements has evoked much comment in recent professional 
and lay  jo u rn a ls .  Most o f  these w r i t in g s ,  however, presume--as genera lly  
accepted knowledge--a fa u l ty  concept o f  the ro le  o f the E u ro -d o l la r  market in 
in te rn a t io n a l  flows. As th is  market can a f fe c t  c ap ita l  flows w ith  s ig n if ic a n t  
impact, the basic ro le  o f the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  must be understood. Exposure 
and correc tion  o f  c e rta in  erroneous presumptions regarding the fundamental 
nature o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  are the essence o f th is  study.
The question asked here is :  What is  the ro le  o f E u ro -d o lla r  in te re s t
ra tes  in in te rn a t io n a l  cap ita l  flows? The answer is  important because 
c a p ita l  flows represent a s ig n i f ic a n t  and p o ten tia l undermining o f  economic 
p o licy  and p o licy  co n tro l.  S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  the flow o f c a p ita l  funds including  
Eu ro -d o lla rs  can swell or shrink an ind iv idua l country 's  balance o f  payments 
surplus or d e f i c i t  on both a l i q u id i t y  and o f f i c i a l  measurement basis. Flows 
can force a country to change in te r e s t  rates and can force a devaluation or 
re va lu a t io n  of one currency r e la t iv e  to another. Because o f  these po ten tia l  
impacts on any country, the question o f  whether E u ro -d o lla r  ra tes  should be 
considered as d i r e c t ly  linked to U.S. money market ra tes  or as a separate  
market e n t i t y  is  a question whose answer underlies the very nature o f d i f f e r e n t
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p o licy  a l te r n a t iv e s .
In genera l, E uro -do lla rs  and the E u ro -d o lla r  market are considered  
to be an adjunct to the U.S. s e c u r it ie s  and U.S. money market. Consequently, 
the E uro -do llar  in te r e s t  ra te  is considered to r e f l e c t  U.S. in te re s t  rates  
and control o f  the E u ro -d o l la r  ra te  is  considered to be w ith in  the gamut o f  
the normal operations o f  the Federal Reserve. Evidence developed in th is  
study s trongly  suggests th a t  th is  view is  in c o r re c t .  A new explanation is  
proposed as an a l t e r n a t iv e .  The E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  can be conceived o f as an 
opportunity  cost ra te  o f  a l l  in te re s t  ra tes  o f  s im i la r  d e fa u l t ,  market, and 
l i q u id i t y  r is k .  Under th is  approach, the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  must be com petit ive  
w ith  the highest eq u iva len t in te r e s t  ra te  in  each country a f te r  ad justing  
f o r  the cost o f forward cover to avoid exchange r is k .  This explanation is  
substantiated below.
This study concentrates on the question: What is  the ro le  o f  Euro­
d o l la r  in te r e s t  ra tes  in in te rn a t io n a l  c a p ita l  flows? A d d i t io n a l ly ,  i t  deals  
w ith  the re la te d  question o f :  What fa c to rs  are responsible fo r  th is  ro le?
The format fo r  the subsequent analysis is  as fo llow s: The remainder o f  th is
chapter describes the basic c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market and 
discusses the s ig n i f ic a n t  fa c to rs  in the sources and uses o f E uro -d o lla rs .  
Chapter Two reviews four p a r t ic u la r ly  re le v a n t  c o n tr ib u t io n s -- th e  studies by 
Hendershott, Kwack, Black, and Branson. A model o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market and 
re la te d  markets is  presented in Chapter Three, along w ith  a discussion o f  
the re le v an t v a r ia b le s .  This chapter also advances hypotheses o f  i n t e r ­
re la t io n sh ip s  between markets and formulates the estim ators fo r  the subsequent 
empirical ana lys is .  Chapter Four describes the data used. Empirical re su lts
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and t h e i r  in te rp re ta t io n  are presented in Chapter F ive, fa llowed by a com­
parison between th is  study's  r e s u l t  and others in Chapter S ix .  Chapter Seven, 
the conclusion, deals w ith  the im p lica tions  of the f in d in g  th a t  E u ro -d o lla r  
ra tes  are opportunity cost r a te s ,  d is t in c t  from U.S. ra te s .
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Euro-dollars  are a l l  deposits denominated in U.S. d o l la rs  placed with  
commercial banks outside o f the United States including fore ign  branches of 
U.S. banks. Most o f  these bank deposit balances are in te r e s t  bearing; 
however, a small number are in "current accounts" maintained by corporations  
fo r  transaction  purposes.^ A bank which accepts a E u ro -d o lla r  deposit receives  
t y p ic a l ly  a c la im  (d o l la r  balance or deposit) on a bank in the United States 
ra ther than actual cash. Thus,the E u ro -d o lla r  deposit i s ,  in e f f e c t ,  a 
deposit l i a b i l i t y  o f  a U.S. domestic bank due to a fo re ig n  bank including  
fore ign branches of U.S. banks.
Close contact among fore ign  banks which accept and relend the Euro­
d o l la r  deposits forms the loose construction of the market. A high degree 
o f interbank a c t i v i t y  ex is ts  as in te r e s t  ra tes  among the Euro-banks in 
various countries are not uniform a t  any point in time and are constantly  
being arb itrages  both in space (across national boundaries) and in time (among 
various m a tu r i t ie s ) .  The interm ediary function o f  these banks is  to amass 
c ap ita l  funds, lengthen t h e i r  term, and channel them v ia  a series o f in t e r ­
bank depositing and redepositing between the o r ig in a l  non-bank depositors and 
ultim ate  non-bank lenders.
The wholesale nature o f most transactions coupled with the r e la t iv e ly  
small overhead cost to p a r t ic ip a t in g  banks allows bankers to operate on a much
Some w r i te rs  on th is  topic  define  Euro-dollars  only as in te re s t  
bearing deposits , but such s p e c if ic a t io n  is  unnecessary in describing uses, 
sources, and im p lica tio n s .
smaller margin in the E u ro -d o lla r  market (between E u ro -d o lla r  deposit and loan 
ra tes ) than the margins fo r  o v era ll  transactions in the domestic economy. 
Because i t  is  a wholesale operation and, th e re fo re ,  not a v a i la b le  to a l l  depos­
i to rs  and borrowers, these reduced margins do not compel the Euro-banks to
2
reduce operating margins in t h e i r  domestic currency transactions .
The immediate depositors o f d o l la rs  in Euro-banks can be c la s s i f ie d  as:
1. p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls ,  p a rtn ersh ip s , and corporations; 2. centra l banks; and
3. the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlem ents. However, the underlying source o f  
d o lla rs  to these depositors is  u ncerta in . Primary deposits are those deposits  
which enable the Euro-banking system to increase i t s  holding o f cash. The 
source o f  primary deposits is  g e n era lly  accepted as u l t im a te ly  a r is in g  from 
U.S. balance o f payments tran sac tio n s . However, debates continue over the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  and nature o f induced or d e r iv a t iv e  deposits and on the manner 
in  which U.S. balance o f payments transactions give r is e  to primary Euro­
d o l la r  deposits. Arguments over the major sources o f E u ro -d o lla r  deposit 
growth fo l lo w  three  general l in e s .
F i r s t  is  an argument th a t  m u lt ip le  expansion of Euro -do llars  occurs 
w ith in  a E u ro -d o lla r  system. The m u lt ip le  expansion argument is  based upon 
drawing p a r a l le ls  between the U.S. banking system and the E u ro -d o lla r  market. 
Growth o f  E u ro -d o lla rs ,  accord ing ly , is based upon the re -deposit ing  of Euro-
Zjane Sneddon L i t t l e ,  "The Euro-D olla r  Market, I t s  Nature and Impact", 
Federal Reserve Bank o f Boston's New England Economic Review, May-June, 1969, 
p. 3.
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d o l la r  loan proceeds w ith  Euro-banks. In a study by Klaus F r ie d r ic k  , a model 
fo r  both c r e d i t  and deposit c reation  is  presented. The model shows deposits  
as an inverse function  of 1) reserves held on deposits from non-bank 
sources, 2) reserves held on in ter-bank  depos its , 3) the number o f i n t e r ­
mediaries in terven ing  between the o r ig in a l  primary deposit and loan to a non­
bank o u t le t ,  and 4) leakage in the system. As reserves on both interbank  
deposits and deposits from non-bank sources are kept a t  a minimum and the 
number o f  in term ed iaries  optimized fo r  p r o f i t ,  the question o f m u lt ip le  
crea tion  rests  upon the s ize  of leakages. At th is  point a d e f in i t io n a l  
problem a r is e s .  I f  m u lt ip le  creation  is  defined to take place only when 
E u ro -d o lla r  loans are immediately redeposited in the E uro -do llar  system, then 
leakage takes place any time th is  instantaneous redeposit is absent. Such 
a d e f in i t io n  has lead Kern to l i s t  "m u lt ip le  c re d it -c re a t io n  based on 
f ra c t io n a l  banking reserves"^ and "repeated r e - in je c t io n  in to  the market o f  
the same d o l la r  held by a non-United States resident"^  as separate explanations  
fo r  the source o f  E u ro -d o lla r  deposits. I f ,  ins tead , m u lt ip le  crea tion  is  
defined as a lagged redeposit system w ith  the time fo r  reflow extended in tim e,  
the proponents o f  th is  source o f E u ro -d o lla r  deposits would probably increase in  
number as the s p ec if ied  time period was extended. As Clendenning notes:
This type o f m u lt ip le  creation  is  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  from the normal 
concept o f m u lt ip le  creation  in a domestic banking system and is  a 
broader concept th a t  involved a time element a r is in g  from the m u lt ip le
^Klaus F r ie d r ic k ,  "The Euro-Dollar System and In te rn a t io n a l L iq u id i ty " ,  
Journal o f  Money C red it  and Banking, August 1970, p. 342.
^David Kern, " In te rn a t io n a l  Finance and the Euro-Dollar Market, "National 
Westminster Bank Review, November 1971, p. 18.
S ib id . ,  p. 19.
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rounds o f  transactions th a t  could occur outside the E u ro -d o lla r  system 
before any deposit re flow  takes p la c e .6
Given th is  broader d e f in i t io n  o f m u lt ip le  c re d i t  c re a t io n ,  proponents 
fe e l  th a t  w h ile  leakages may be g re a t ,  the m u lt ip le  c rea tion  o f deposits and 
loans has been a s ig n if ic a n t  fa c to r  in the expansion o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market. 
Manipulation o f  the F r ie d r ic k  model i l lu s t r a t e s  th a t  "The po in t here is  not to  
deny th a t  leakage is  an important c o n s tra in t  but to show th a t  even with  
considerable leakage, the proposed deposit creation m u lt ip le  (using i n t e r ­
bank plus non-bank deposit reserves plus intermediary turnover) y ie ld s  
s ig n i f ic a n t  re s u lts .
Arguments against m u lt ip le  c rea tion  stress the large  leakages, p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  in the years o f rapid growth o f the market^due to borrowings by United  
States banks.® Increases in  United States bank borrowings (such as in 1966,
1967, 1969, and the f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1970) amount to a withdrawal o f  po te n tia l  
secondary deposits from the m u lt ip le  expansion p o te n tia l  o f  the E uro -do llar  
system; a reduction in borrowings i s ,  in e f f e c t ,  an increase in induced deposits.*  
The second controvers ia l source o f induced E uro -do lla r  deposits , which 
has been claimed to be the primary momentum fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  e x p a n d ib i l i ty
®E. Wayne Clendenning, "E uro-D ollar  and C red it  C reation" , In te rn a t io n a l  
Currency Review, I I I ,  No. 1 :18 , March, A pril  1971.
^ F r ie d r ic k ,  Journal of Money C re d it  and Banking, p. 346, footnote 13.
®E. Wayne Clendenning, The Euro-D o llar  M arket, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970), p. 57; also F r i t z  Machlup, "The Euro-Dollar System and I t s  C ontro l" ,  
In te rn a t io n a l Monetary Problems (Washington: American Enterprise  I n s t i t u t e ,  1972)
p. 711.
^A. James Meigs, "Managing the World's Money Supply, A Comment", Journal 
of Money, C red it  and Banking:669, August, 1969.
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since 1969,10 is  the m u lt ip le  expansion o f fore ign  o f f i c i a l  reserves. This  
case is  s im i la r  to the deposit expansion described above but with the centra l  
banks a t  the core o f  deposit expansion instead o f the Euro-banks. A centra l  
bank places some of i t s  reserves w ith  the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l Settlements  
(BIS) (o r d i r e c t ly  in to  a Euro-bank); the BIS, in tu rn ,  deposits these d o l la rs  
in the E u ro -d o lla r  market which a re ,  u l t im a te ly ,  le n t  to a non-bank borrower 
who, in tu rn ,  converts the d o l la rs  in to  domestic currencies. This conversion
leads to an increase in the reserves of the re c ip ie n t  centra l bank w ithout a
d ec line  in the reserves o f  the o r ig in a l  depositing centra l bank. I f  the 
re c ip ie n t  bank deposits the increase in reserves with the BIS or in the Euro­
d o l la r  market, a second round o f  expansion w i l l  begin. As Machlup has 
summarized:
This fou r-s tep  sequence c le a r ly  shows how one d o l la r  o f  o f f i c i a l  
reserves can become two d o l la rs  in one round. Nothing, o f course, 
prevents a r e p e t i t io n  of the process. Indeed, the observed in flow  
o f ad d it io n a l New York d o l la rs  may induce managers o f  the o f f i c i a l  
reserves to increase th e i r  placements with the BIS or with London 
banks d i r e c t ly .  In th is  fash io n , d o lla rs  may continue to  
create  more d o l la r s ,  as each round ra ises the m u l t ip l ie r  inherent
in the process. I t  can be stopped only by o f f i c i a l s . ' !
This source of E u ro -d o lla r  deposit growth has been denied by central banks.
The f in a l  source o f  E u ro -d o lla r  deposits is  U.S. balance of payments
transactions . The uncerta in ty  o f  th is  source l i e s  in the question o f which
balance o f payments transactions lead to E uro -do llar  deposits and what is  the
appropriate  measure o f th is  source. The l iq u id i t y  d e f in i t io n  o f the U.S.
!^Kern, National Westminster Bank Review, p. 18.
! ! F r i t z  Machlup, "The Magicians and Their  Rabbits", The Morgan 
Guaranty Survey, May 1971, p. 12.
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balance o f  payments is  considered an unacceptable measure o f  primary
deposits in the E uro -do llar  market. Thu;, Kern has s ta ted , "The most important
point is  th a t  the growth o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market is  la rg e ly  independent of
the United States payments d e f i c i t . S i m i l a r l y ,  Friedman has s ta ted , "Balance
o f payments d e f ic i t s  do provide fore igners  with claims on United States d o l la r ;
but there is  nothing to assure th a t  such claims w i l l  be held in the form of
Euro-dollars."13 The only statement close to an argument fo r  United States
balance o f  payments d e f ic i t s  as a source o f E u ro -d o lla r  growth comes from
the T h ir ty - fo u r th  Annual Report o f  the BIS, which s ta tes:
At f i r s t  the basic d e f i c i t  in the United States balance of payments 
contributed to the development o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market by putting  
large  amounts o f d o lla rs  d i r e c t ly  in to  fo re ign  hands. At a la t e r  
stage, however, the market d i r e c t ly  or in d i r e c t ly  a ttra c ted  additional  
resources from United States firms and t h e i r  a f f i l i a t e s .  This gave 
r i s e . . . t o  an increase in United States l i a b i l i t i e s  w h ich .. .means an 
increase in the United States balance o f payments d e f i c i t  ( l i q u id i t y
d e f i n i t i o n ) . 14
Notwithstanding the o vera l l  v a l id i t y  o f  the statements o f  Kern, F r ied ­
man, and the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l Settlem ents, t h e i r  dogged concentration on 
balance o f payments d e f ic i t s  is  inappropria te . The s ig n if ic a n t  v ar ia b le  is  
the accumulated net d o l la r  flows; i . e . ,  the stock o f d o lla rs  accumulated by 
fore igners as a re s u lt  o f any type o f in te rn a t io n a l  transaction . What is  
important fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  market is  the to ta l  stock o f d o lla rs  which has 
accumulated in the hands o f  the fore ign  public  (as reserves) and p r iva te
^^Kern, National Westminster Bank Review, p. 18.
l^M ilton  Friedman, "The Euro-Dollar Market: Some F i r s t  P r in c ip le s " ,  
The Morgan Guaranty Survey, October 1969, p. 5.
^^Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l Settlements T h ir ty - fo u r th  Annual Report, 
(Basle, June 1964), p. 140.
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a u th o r i t ie s .  This aggregate s t a t i s t i c  represents the to ta l  volume of
p o te n tia l  primary deposits in the E u ro -d o lla r  market. In c o n tras t ,  balance
o f payments d e f ic i t s  net out items which do not necessarily  represent a r e f lu x
of d o l la r  balances. At the same tim e, to ta l  l iq u id  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f U.S. banks
w i l l  tend to o v e r -s ta te  aggregate net d o l la r  flows because o f  the im p o s s ib i l i ty
15
o f d is t in g u ish in g  primary from secondary deposits. To the extent th a t  
m u lt ip le  expansion o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market and/or m u lt ip le  expansion of  
o f f i c i a l  reserves take place, m u lt ip le  expansion o f  accumulated net d o l la r  flows  
occurs; and the e n t i re  question o f expansion can be viewed in these terms.
Given th is  d e f in i t io n  o f  accumulated net d o l la r  flows, a remaining 
question is  to  what extent do changes in  th is  source o f Euro-dollars  a f fe c t  
the growth o f  the E uro -do lla r  market. F i r s t ,  i t  is  genera lly  accepted th a t  
the d o l la r  flows contributed s u f f ic ie n t  l i q u id i t y  to enable the s trang ling  
tangle o f  exchange controls to be re laxed in 1958-59, a p re req u is ite  to the 
development o f  the E uro -do llar  market. Secondly, without th is  outflow  o f  
d o l la rs ,  there  would not have been any substan tia l accumulation o f  d o l la r  deposits  
held by fo re igners  on which the c rea tion  and development of the market 
d e p e n d e d . F in a l ly ,  the ra te  o f growth o f  d o l la r  flows probably has g rea te r  
impact than expected fo r  both short and long run growth of the E u ro -d o lla r  and
l^Machlup, The Morgan Guaranty Survey; Idem, "Euro-Dollar Creation:
A Mystery S to ry" ,  Banco Nazionale del Lavaro Q uarterly  Review (September 1970).  
For example, i f  E uro -do llar  deposits are le n t  to a Frenchman who converts them 
to Francs, to ta l  U.S. l iq u id  l i a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  include the Euro-bank's deposit  
with a U.S. bank plus the French Bank's claim on d o lla rs  during the check 
c lear ing  process. I t  should be noted th a t  only changes in the U.S. l i q u id i t y  
l i a b i l i t i e s  to fore igners  are reported in the Balance o f  Payments.
^^Clendenning, The Euro-Dollar Market, p. 57 f f .
-11
in te rn a t io n a l in te r e s t  ra te s .  This la s t  pronouncement contrasts  sharply with  
Clendenning and others who s ta te  th a t  the market could s t i l l  e x is t  even i f  the 
outflow from the United States was completely stopped or r e v e r s e d . T h e  
paradox l ie s  in the d e f in i t io n s  o f flows: most w r ite rs  on the subject define
the outflow in terms o f  the l i q u id i t y  d e f in i t io n  o f balance o f  payments 
d e f ic i t s .  In c o n tra s t ,  the net d o l la r  flows in any given year are more 
c lo se ly  re la te d  to the volume o f  world trade and c a p ita l  transactions  
in  which the United States is  involved so th a t  the United States  balance 
o f payments d e f ic i t s  can be reversed concurrently  w ith  increases in net 
d o l la r  outflows. For example, i f  a l l  U.S. imports are paid fo r  in d o lla rs  
and are held by the p r iv a te  fo re ign  sector as short term l iq u id  claims  
on the U. S. ,  and i f  a l l  U.S. exports are paid fo r  w ith  fo re ig n  s e c u r i t ie s ,  
to ta l  fore ign d o l la r  holdings w i l l  have increased even i f  the  U.S. exports  
are greater than imports. Furthermore, the argument th a t  estimates o f  
E uro -do llar  deposits have been la rg e r  than l i a b i l i t i e s  of United States banks 
to non-residents in recent years is  not an argument against the claim th a t  
changes in accumulated d o l la r  outflows have an e f fe c t  upon the growth o f  the 
E uro -do lla r  market, but ra th e r  is  an argument fo r  some type o f  m u lt ip le  
expansion on the d o l la r  outflows taking place.
Euro-do llar  loans, which play a ro le  complementary to deposits in the 
growth of the E u ro -d o lla r  market, are extended to finance transactions  occurring  
in  both d o lla rs  and fore ign  currencies . H is t o r ic a l ly ,  the most important d o l la r  
users or borrowers have been the U.S. banks. One might conceive o f the r e la t io n ­
ship between U.S. banks and the E u ro -d o lla r  market as o l ig o p s o n is t ic  or monop- 
s o n is t ic .  The la rg e r  banks in the United States have been using Euro-dollars
^^Clendenning, The Euro-Dollar M arket, p. 57.
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1) to expand c r e d i t ,  2) to  finance week-end reserve p o s it io n s , 3) to finance  
c e r ta in  loans, and 4) to obtain operating balances fo r  overseas branches. These 
uses have had a major impact on the s tru c tu re  of the market.
The borrowing of Euro -do llars  to extend loans in the U.S. reduces the  
average r a t io  of required reserves to  both deposits and equiva lent l i a b i l i t i e s  
because reserve requirements are lower on borrowings than on demand deposits ,  
and because, u n t i l  re c e n t ly ,  there  were no reserve requirements whatever on 
these borrowings. While th is  average reserve r a t io  does not n ecessarily  mean 
an increase in to ta l  reserves, other things held constant, i t  does enable the  
banking system to acquire ad d it io n a l earning assets fo r  the same reserve base. 
Given the amount o f required reserves, the increased amount o f  loanable funds 
does not have the m u lt ip le  expansion e f fe c t  in the sense o f  a net in je c t io n  o f  
funds in to  the commercial banking system^^ because nearly  a l l  E u ro -d o lla r  
deposits held by "Eurobanks" ( inc lud in g  fore ign  branches o f United States banks) 
are in  the form of claims on American banks. For example, i f  Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A. borrows Euro-do llars  from i t s  London branch, the New York bank w i l l  
rece ive  as an asset a claim on another U.S. bank (say, Morgan Guaranty). Conse­
quently , to ta l  l i a b i l i t i e s  of the banking system i n i t i a l l y  would not show a net 
change as can be seen below in the s im p li f ie d  balance sheets:
Chase Manhattan -  London 
assets_______________________________________ l i a b i l i t i e s
before $10 m i l .  claim on $10 m il .  deposit from
loan Morgan Guaranty foreign source
TBpriedman, The Morgan Guaranty Survey, p. 4.
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Chase Manhattan -
assets
London
l i a b i l i t i e s
a f t e r -$10 m i l . claim on $10 m i l . deposit from
loan Morgan Guaranty 
+$10 m i l . claim on 
Chase-New York
fo re ig n  source
Chase Manhattan - New York
a f t e r +$10 m i l . cash or +$10 m i l . loan from
loan earning assets
(or deposit w ith  Morgan)
Chase-London
Morgan Guaranty - New York
assets l i a b i l i t i e s
a f t e r -$10 m i l . cash or -$10 m i l . deposit due
loan earning assets Chase-London
I f  the banking system is  f u l l y  loaned up, Chase w i l l  acquire  and Morgan Guaranty 
w i l l  l iq u id a te  earning assets. I f  the system is  not f u l l y  loaned up, Chase 
may hold cash or deposits w ith  Morgan Guaranty. The former case is  shown above.
The only manner in which E u ro -d o lla r  borrowing can ac t as a net 
in je c t io n  in to  the U.S. banking system is  i f  the o r ig in a l  source o f the Euro­
d o lla rs  represents e i t h e r  dishording o f actual d o l la rs  or c rea tio n  of Euro­
d o l la rs  by the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, E uro -do lla rs  borrowings 
increases the supply o f loanable funds and money in the U.S. banking system.
When the borrowing o f  Euro-dollars  s h i f ts  the banking system l i a b i l i t i e s  
from the higher reserve requirements ( in  New York) fo r  demand deposits l i a b i l i ­
t ie s  to the lower or nonexistent reserve requirements fo r  borrowed l i a b i l i t i e s ,  
there  can be l im ite d  c r e d i t  expansion. The m u lt ip le  contrac t ion  in i t i a t e d  in
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the above example by Morgan Guaranty's loss o f  deposits when Chase-New York 
draws down i t s  claim on Morgan Guaranty w i l l  be more than o f fs e t  by the 
m u ltip le  expansion s ta r te d  by Chase Manhattan-New York Euro-do llar  loan 
because o f  the lower reserve requirements on the f i r s t  round of the expansion 
process.
To r e i t e r a t e ,  the increase in loanable funds a r is in g  from reserve  
requirement d i f f e r e n t ia ls  does not lead to m u lt ip le  expansion in the sense 
th a t  the standard textbook reserve m u l t ip l ie r  fo r  the system has increased. 
Instead, re a l lo c a t io n  o f l i a b i l i t i e s  has increased e x p a n s ib i l i ty  of the 
system by changing the composition o f to ta l  reserves. Consequently, the 
use of a money m u l t ip l ie r  (exclusive o f  borrowings) as an explanation fo r  U.S. 
monetary expansion is  inadequate w ithout the inclus ion  of reserve requirements 
against E uro -do lla r  borrowings.
In add ition  to c re d i t  expansion, head o f f ic e s  o f banks in the United
States have been able to use th e i r  overseas branch balances in a manner
analogous to the use of federal funds. E u ro -d o lla rs ,  while  not s u itab le  fo r
day-to-day cash and reserve position adjustments because o f the distance and
the two day c lea r in g  time period, are useful fo r  weekend adjustments. Thus,
most banks with overseas branches use overnight deposits each Thursday as a
19
p a r t ia l  su b st itu te  fo r  federal fund purchases on Friday.
U n t il  Regulation D (see appendix) was amended in July, 1969, e f fe c t iv e  
reserve requirements declined during the c lear ing  o f  overnight loans from
ISpred Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the L iq u id i ty  and Reserve Management 
of U.S. Banks", Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York Monthly Review (July  1968),  
p. 133.
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branches because the check received from the overseas branch increased the
cash items in the process o f c o l le c t io n ,  items which were deductible from
deposits in computing reserve requirements. Furthermore, the b i l ls -p a y a b le
check used to repay the borrowed Euro-dollars  was also not included in
deposits subject to reserve requirements.. As a r e s u l t ,  banks in need of
funds to meet reserve requirements had been w i l l in g  to pay more than three
times the a n tic ip a ted  federa l funds ra te  on Thursday fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  loans
fo r  the weekend. This loophole in Federal Reserve regu lations  was s ig n i f ic a n t .
The Federal Reserve o f  S t.  Louis has noted th a t  money supply revis ions based
21on the change Regulation D show s ig n i f ic a n t ly  fa s te r  ra tes  o f growth 
than do the o r ig in a l  demand deposit series.^2 While th is  a b i l i t y  to reduce 
reserve requirements fo r  the e n t i re  weekend no longer e x is ts ,  the amendment 
does not hamper the use o f Euro-dollars  fo r  b o ls te rin g  weekend reserve  
positions.
Banks in the U.S. have also a c t iv e ly  used the E u ro -d o lla r  market to  
re finance loans to fo re ig n ers .  From the inception o f  the voluntary r e s t r a in t  
program fo r  balance o f payments purposed u n t i l  the 1968 change in Regulation M,
ZOpred Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the L iq u id i ty  and Reserve Management 
of U.S. Banks", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review (Ju ly  1968),  
p. 132.
Z lfh e  Regulation D change re fe rs  to the d e f in i t io n  o f  gross deposits to 
include certa in  items issued by overseas branches.
Z^Aibert E. Burger, "Revision o f the Money Supply S er ies" , Federal Reserve 
Bank o f St. Louis Review, (October 1969), Vol. 51, No. 10, p. 7FF.
Z^Klopstock, Monthly Review, p. 132.
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r e s t r ic t in g  the sa le  of loans, banks in the United States were able to s e l l  
loans normally made to fo re ign  in d iv id u a ls  and corporations to  t h e i r  overseas 
branches, thus enabling the head o f f ic e s  to maintain t h e i r  outstanding claims 
below the voluntary  quota c e i l in g s  w h ile  a t  the same time enabling them to  
serv ice  fo re ig n  customers. Many banks w ithout foreign branches made arrange­
ments to s e l l  substantia l amounts to E u ro -d o lla r  banks under re-purchase  
agreem ents--transactions which also increased fore ign  claims outstanding.
The amendments to Regulation should have reduced the amount o f  new sales 
over and above a c e r ta in  le v e l .  However, o f  greater q u a n t i ta t iv e  importance 
are loans which are made d i r e c t ly  by fo re ig n  branches to meet loan demands 
of head o f f ic e s .  While these loans are also a ffec ted  by Regulation M to  
the ex ten t th a t  the loans are made to  United States re s id e n ts ,  there  is  
considerable leeway fo r  continuation o f  th is  type o f f in an c in g . The su b st i­
tu t io n  o f E u ro -d o lla r  loans fo r  d i r e c t  U.S. loans would have the e f f e c t  o f  
reducing the leakage underlying the U.S. money m u l t ip l ie r .
F in a l ly ,  fo re ign  branches o f United States banks often  hold accounts 
a t  domestic o f f ic e s  as precautionary reserves which could be used to  meet
o b lig a t io n s  a r is in g  from temporary discrepancies between payments and receipts
25o f Euro -do llars  or sudden unantic ipated  demands. These vo luntary  reserves  
are a c tu a l ly  unnecessary i f  the head o f f ic e  authorizes the branch to  overdraw 
i t s  domestic deposit account.^6 Notwithstanding, the amount o f  precautionary
24%he amendments place reserve requirements on marginal E u ro -d o lla r  
borrowings and c e r ta in  loans made by overseas branches.
ZSpriedman, The Morgan Guaranty Survey, p. 6.
Z^Klopstock, Monthly Review, p. 132.
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balances c a rr ie d  by overseas branches both as cash on hand and balances w ith  
the head o f f ic e  tends to be minimal because o f  the sm aller in te re s t  margins 
and the re s u l ta n t  need to minimize the amount o f  u n p ro fitab le  assets with  
which the E u ro -d o lla r  market banks operate and because there are no regulations  
except the amendment to Regulation M (see appendix) req u ir in g  immobilization  
of a p o rtion  o f  earning assets a t  centra l banks.
In add ition  to  the re la t io n s h ip  between U.S. banks and Euro-banks, 
E u ro -d o lla r  loans to fo re ig n  users are made fo r  the f inancing o f business 
tran sac tio n s , a rb it ra g e  and speculation. While the mainstay of E uro -do lla r  
loans to fore igners  has been fo r  the d i r e c t  financing o f in te rn a t io n a l t ra d e ,  
the growth o f the m u lt i -n a t io n a l  corporation has made the financing o f  less  
t ra d e - re la te d  items (such as seasonal l i q u id i t y  needs and inventory) a 
standard part o f Euro-bank loan p o r t fo l io s .  A rb itragers  are also important 
users o f  E u ro -d o lla rs .  They borrow Euro-do llars  and convert them in to  
other currencies to take advantage o f  dev ia tions  from covered in te re s t  p a r i ty .  
F in a l ly ,  speculators borrow Euro-dollars  to finance purchases o f undervalued 
currencies and to finance purchases o f hard m etals , p a r t ic u la r ly  gold.
CHAPTER I I  
Results o f  Other Studies
There are no studies which e x p l i c i t l y  t e s t  the ro le  of the E u ro -d o lla r  
market in c a p ita l  flows. The in s p ira t io n  fo r  a study o f th is  kind derives from 
a statement by Kindleberger th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  was becoming a world currency  
but th a t  " . . . t h e  E uro -do llar  market (must) grow s t i l l  fu r th e r  and become
27
independent of the New York money market ra th e r  than an extension o f  i t . . . "  
(Parenthesis added.)
28An a r t i c l e  by Hendershott on the E u ro -d o lla r  market is  concerned with  
the length o f time required fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  to ad just to a change in 
the U.S. ra te .  The model is divided in to  the supply and demand fo r  E uro -do llar  
deposits and the demand and supply o f  E u ro -d o lla r  loans, the l a t t e r  (the  supply 
of loans) is  derived from the supply o f  deposits schedule. Thus he derived:
Deposit Demand D^^ = 3g + 3-j r""  ^ + 82 r^^ 3-]> 0 3g< 0
Deposit Supply S^g = Bg + r^*^ + gg r^^ 0 Bg) 0
Loan Demand DEL = 3^ + 3  ^ r^*" + 3^ r® 3^< 0 3g> 0
^^Kindleberger, p. 7.
28p a tr ic  H. Hendershott, "The S tru c tu re  o f  In te rn a t io n a l In te r e s t  Rates: 
The United States Treasury B i l l  Rate and The Euro-Dollar Deposit Rate" Journal 
of Finance (September, 1967) pages 455-465.
-19-
= E u ro -d o lla r  deposit ra te
US
r  = U.S. deposit ra te  
r® = a l te r n a t iv e  cost o f  funds 
r^L = E u ru -d o lla r  loan ra te  
Solving fo r  the deposit ra te  he gets
Hendershott's concept o f  a l te r n a t iv e  costs only a f fe c ts  borrowers o f Euro­
d o lla rs  in his model. He s ta tes: "A lte rn a t ive  costs o f  funds to borrowers o f
E uro-dollars  include both t h e i r  domestic cost o f  borrowing short term funds and
29the cost of borrowing short term funds in New York." However, Hendershott 
uses the United States b i l l  ra te  as a proxy fo r  a l l  a l te r n a t iv e  costs. Using 
a d iscre te  form o f  a K oyak-Nerl'-e  type equation plus the mean values o f
in te re s t  rates during the period o f measurement he a rr iv e s  a t:
.E D  , ED ED. ED . .
Ar = k ( r  -  r  ) where r  = equ ilib r ium  E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  e e
By th is  method, Hendershott tests  the E uro -do llar  ra te  against a
United States ra te  with a one and two period lag . His re s u lts  in d ica te  th a t
the E uro -do lla r  ra te  adjusts completely to changes in the United States b i l l
r a te ,  but the process takes about one year. However, using lagged q u a r te r ly
data , he finds the E u ro -d o lla r  deposit ra te  only adjusts p a rt  way to changesin
29
U.S. in te r e s t  ra tes .
Kwack, in extending the Hendershott study, is  concerned with the impact 
of fore ign  in te re s t  rates on the time lag fo r  adjustment o f the E uro -do llar
29patr ic  H. Hendershott, "The S tructure  o f In te rn a t io n a l  In te re s t  Rates:
The United States Treasury B i l l  Rate and The Euro-Dollar Deposit Rate". Journal 
of Finance (September, 1967) pp. 455-465.
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ra te  to changes in the U.S. ra te .  He uses the same model except fore ign  rates
are included in the deposit supply fu n c tio n . He finds:
"To the extent th a t  fo re ign  ra tes  are a ffec ted  by the United States  
ra te  and other economic fac to rs  exogenous to the United States r a te ,  
the time required fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  to achieve a complete 
adjustment to changes in the United States ra te  appears to be longer 
than th a t  found when only the United States is  considered. When 
fore ign rates vary independently o f  the United States r a te ,  the 
response of the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  to changes in the United States  
ra te  is  found to  be p a r t i a l .
B lack^l, in  his a r t i c l e ,  attempts unsuccessfully to estab lish  a fo re ­
casting model fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s . He considers only the demand function  
fo r  Euro-dollars  by United States banks. He equates th is  function with the 
supply o f E uro -d o lla rs .  Thus, he uses borrowings by United States banks from 
t h e i r  overseas branches as his q u a n tity  f ig u re s . On the demand s id e , he 
includes E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s ,  CD ra te s .  Federal fund ra te s ,  and Treasury b i l l  
ra te s ;  on the supply s id e , he includes the E uro -do llar  r a te ,  the Treasury b i l l  
r a te ,  the discount on the forward pound, the United Kingdom bank ra te ,  and a 
measure o f the United States Balance of Payments voluntary  r e s t r ic t io n  program. 
In his estimate o f a supply-equal-demand-reduced form equation, he finds tha t  
the United Kingdom bank ra te  and United States Voluntary fore ign r e s t r ic t io n  do 
not enter s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in to  the determination o f the E uro -do lla r  ra te  and th a t  
there  is  a s ig n i f ic a n t  trend term which he explains as the re s u lt  o f increasing  
awareness o f the ben efits  o f  bank borrowings from the E u ro -d o lla r  market. His
30sung Y. Kwack, "The S tructure  o f In te rn a t io n a l In te re s t  Rates: An
Extension o f Hendershott's Tests" , Journal of Finance, (S e p t . ,  1971), Vol. XXVI,  
No. 4,  pages 897-900.
^^Stanley W. Black, "An Econometric Study o f  E u ro -d o lla r  Borrowing by 
New York Banks and the Rate o f  In te re s t  on E uro-D o lla rs" , Journal o f Finance, 
(Feb. 1970) pages 83-88.
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fo recast has la rge  e rro rs  which, in p a r t ,  he claims are the r e s u l t  o f  a change 
in market conditions.
F in a l ly ,  Branson^^, in a study o f  c a p ita l  flows in the U.S.  balance 
o f payments, tes ts  the s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  U .S .- fo re ig n  in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  
and U .S .-E u ro -d o l la r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  to changes in  U.S. and fore ign  ra tes . He 
uses the fo llow ing  two equations fo r  estim ators:
(1) V  = a iuS + Ml
(2) T f  = b ^ f  + ug
where V  represents a l t e r n a t iv e  U .S .- fo re ig n  in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  ( i n ­
cluding the E u ro -d o l la r  r a t e ) ,  ^US represents the U.S. in te re s t  r a te ,  i f  
represents various fo re ig n  and E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s ,  and y represents the e r ro r .
He finds th a t  w ith  the exception o f the E u ro -d o lla r  r a te ,  the fo re ign  
ra te  changes expla in  more o f the variance in  changes in  in te re s t  ra te  d i f f e r ­
e n t ia ls  than do the changes in the U.S.  ra te .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  he finds th a t  
fore ign national ra tes  respond fa s te r  to changes in the U.S. ra te  than to the  
E u ro -d o lla r  ra te .
With the exception o f the portion o f  the Branson study reviewed, the  
l i t e r a t u r e  presumes an alignment between the U.S.  and E u ro -d o lla r  markets. In  
the case of Hendershott and Kwack, a re la t io n s h ip  between the two market's  
in te re s t  rates obviously underlies the time lag studies undertaken by these
authors. In the case o f  Black's  a n a ly s is ,  the stock o f Euro-dollars  is
approximated by the volume o f U.S.  bank borrowings, implying a close r e la t io n ­
ship between the U.S. and E uro -do lla r  markets and biasing the resu lts  in th is
^^Branson
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d ire c t io n  as w i l l  be subsequently shown.
The concept o f  opportunity  costs is  considered by Hendershott and Kwack 
in terms o f a l te rn a te  costs o f funds to borrowers o f  E u ro -d o lla rs .  However, 
Hendershott uses the U.S. b i l l  ra te  to approximate the opportunity  costs of 
borrowing in both the U.S. and fo re ign  domestic market. Kwack extends the 
opportunity cost approximation by adding fo re ign  in te r e s t  ra te s ,  but neglects  
the cost o f  forward cover in  his a n a lys is .  As a r e s u l t ,  the concept of a 
comparable a l te r n a t iv e  cost was not developed by these s tud ies.
In the Branson study, the te s t in g  o f  the s e n s i t iv i t y  o f  in te r e s t  ra te  
d i f f e r e n t ia ls  to  changes in U.S. ra tes  and fore ign  ra tes  suggests a manner o f  
te s t in g  the r e la t iv e  s e n s i t iv i t y  o f  in te r e s t  d i f f e r e n t ia l  fo r  comparing the 
U.S. and E uro -do llar  in te r e s t  rates undertaken la t e r  in Chapter V. A d d it io n a l ly ,  
a re p e t i t io n  o f  Branson's study using more recent data (from id e n t ic a l  sources) 
changes Branson's f ind ings  s u b s ta n t ia l ly .
CHAPTER I I I  
The S tructure  o f the Euro-Dollar Market
Models o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market and re la te d  markets can be formulated  
to  i l l u s t r a t e  the in te r - re la t io n s h ip s  o f var iab les  a f fe c t in g  the E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te .  To s im p lify  and c ry s ta l iz e  these re la t io n s h ip s ,  several assumptions 
are made. F i r s t ,  the dimensions of the world c ap ita l  markets are reduced 
to  three spheres: the New York or U.S. market, the fo re ign  market, and the
E u ro -d o lla r  market. Second, p e rfec t c a p ita l  markets w ith in  each domestic 
sphere are assumed. Consequently, one in te r e s t  ra te  is  considered to e x is t  
in  any market. Next, the reserves held by Euro-banks fo r  l i q u id i t y  purposes 
are assumed equal to zero. As a r e s u l t ,  the demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  deposits  
is  equal to the supply o f  E uro -do llar  loans. This p a r t ic u la r  assumption is  
not u n r e a l is t ic ;  actual reserve balances of Euro-banks are minimal, and the 
demand fo r  deposits is  a function of a n t ic ip a te d  loan volume. F in a l ly ,  Euro­
banks are assumed to be p r o f i t  maximizers. Banks w i l l  extend loans and demand 
deposits up to the po in t where the marginal revenue from loans equals the 
marginal cost of deposits. Given these assumptions, three  money market models 
can be formulated based upon the variab les  a f fe c t in g  the supply and demand 
fo r  deposits in each market.
The Euro-Dollar Market 
The Demand fo r  Euro-Dollars
The demand fo r  E uro -do lla r  deposits depends on the loan demand fo r
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E uro -d o lla rs ,  given the assumptions o f  the model. Loan demand, in tu rn ,
depends upon the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and the fo llow ing fa c to rs :  the s ta te  of
aggregate economic a c t iv i t y  in various countries , the cost o f  borrowing from
other sources, r e s t r ic t io n s  on borrowing E uro -d o lla rs ,  and the degree of
speculative  fe rv o r .  These variab les  w i l l  be considered in order.
The State  o f the Economies -  E uro -do llar  demand w i l l  f lu c tu a te
d i r e c t ly  w ith the ra te  o f  growth of output in the world. The stronger
the ongoing economic processes, the g reater  the demand fo r  E uro -d o lla rs .  The
term, "s ta te  o f the economies", encompasses not only the lev e l o f  economic
a c t iv i t y  or gross national product but also the expectations fo r  the fu tu re .
According to Clendenning:
"The fundamental fa c to r  underlying the demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla rs is  the 
leve l o f  economic a c t iv i t y  in the countries ( inc lud in g  the United 
States) th a t  p a r t ic ip a te  in the market. I f  the leve l o f  a c t iv i t y  is 
high, the demand fo r  c re d i t  fo r  f inancing both fore ign  trade  and 
domestic a c t iv i t y  w i l l  a lso be high. I f  th is  demand cannot be 
met dom estically  and, p a r t ic u la r ly ,  i f  a n t i - in f l a t io n a r y  monetary 
measures are being used, there w i l l  be an incen tive  fo r  the 
residents of these countries to seek add itional f inanc ing  abroad -  
of which the E u ro -d o lla r  market is  one source ."33
In te re s t  Rates -  The assumption o f one in te re s t  ra te  in each market
means th a t  the demand fo r  E uro -do llar  deposits w i l l  be derived from the demand
fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  loans which, in tu rn , w i l l  depend upon the competitiveness
o f E u ro -d o lla r  rates w ith  a l te rn a t iv e  borrowing o p p o rtu n it ie s .  In th is  model,
the U.S. and fore ign  rates are the re levan t in te re s t  v a r ia b le s .
In the case o f  the U.S. in te re s t  ra te ,  a d i r e c t  comparison o f  i t s
ra te  and the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  can be made, fo r  there is no need to introduce
exchange rates in making such a comparison. In the case o f fore ign  ra te s .
33e . Warren Clendenning, The Euro-Dollar Market (Oxford: Clarenden
Press, 1970), p. 67.
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consideration o f  the cost o f  forward exchange must be included. Forward 
exchange is the c u rren t ly  established exchange ra te  between two currencies  
fo r  d e liv e ry  a t  a d e f in i te  fu ture  date . Unlike the spot exchange r a te ,  
the forward ra te  is  not normally pegged w ith in  a narrow range, but 
f lu c tu a tes  according to the supply and demand fo r  currencies to be de livered  
in the f u t u r e .^4 a borrower wishing to hedge against possible adverse 
changes in the spot ra te  can borrow d o l la r s ,  convert them a t the spot ra te  
in to  his domestic currency, and a t  the same time buy d o lla rs  forward fo r  
the date on which the loan must be rep a id . The re levant cost o f  th is  
forward cover is  the d iffe ren ce  between the forward ra te  and the spot 
ra te ,  a cost which must be added to the d o l la r  cost o f  the loan. The 
cost is p o s it ive  i f  the forward fo re ign  currency is  below the spot ra te  ( i . e . ,  
the cost of the forward d o l la r  is  above the current p r ice )  and is  negative  
i f  the forward fore ign  currency is  above the spot price  ( i . e . ,  the forward  
d o l la r  price  is  a t  a d iscount). A l te r n a t iv e ly ,  th is  hedging cost can be 
stated in percentage form ca lled  the forward premium or discount. The 
premium or discount, ca lcu lated  by d iv id in g  the forward exchange ra te  minus 
the spot ra te  by the spot ra te  (times 100 ),  can be added to the in te r e s t  cost of  
the loan to determine to ta l  cost o f  borrowing abroad. From the vantage point  
of the E u ro -d o lla r  market, fore ign in te r e s t  rates can be converted in to  
comparable d o l la r  rates by adding the premium or subtracting the discount on 
fore ign currencies in d o l la r  terms. This adjusted fore ign r a te ,  henceforth.
^^ In tervention  in the forward market has occurred p r im a r i ly  during  
periods o f heavy speculation.
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is  re fe rre d  to as the "comparable" fo re ign  ra te .
C eteris  paribus, the demand fo r  Euro-do llars  varies  in verse ly  with  
the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and d i r e c t ly  w ith  the U.S. and comparable fo re ig n  ra te .
The higher the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  i s ,  the more l i k e l y  a l t e r n a t iv e  sources 
o f  funds w i l l  be sought by borrowers. Conversely, the higher the U.S. ra te  
or comparable fo re ign  ra te  i s ,  the g reater  the demand fo r  Euro -do llars  and 
the higher the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te .
R estr ic t io n s  on borrowing Euro-dollars  - The demand fo r  Euro-do llars  
should be adversely a ffe c ted  by the imposition o f re s t r ic t io n s  on the in flow  
of Euro-dollars  in to  a country. In the case o f  the United S ta te s ,  imposition  
of reserve requirements on marginal E u ro -d o lla r  borrowings and imposition  
o f a change in the d e f in i t io n  o f  demand deposits (and, th e re fo re ,  f l o a t )  to  
include d ra fts  on Euro-banks fo r  c a lc u la t io n  o f  reserve requirements should 
have adversely a ffec ted  U.S. demand fo r  E uro -do lla rs . In the case o f  the  
fore ign  country, reserve requirements against increases in domestic l i a b i l i t i e s  
v is -a -v is  non-residents such as those imposed in  Germany in 1970 should also  
decrease E u ro -d o lla r  demand. R e s tr ic t io n s  such as these, by reducing the 
demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla rs ,  should also reduce E u ro -d o lla r  in te r e s t  ra te s .  On 
the other hand, r e s t r ic t io n s  such as Regulation Q, which regu lates  the maximum 
in te re s t  payable in the U .S . ,  act to increase the demand fo r  Euro-do llars  when 
the c e i l in g  ra te  is  below the U.S. market eq u ilib r ium  ra te .  The imposition  
and removal o f  Regulation Q thus should increase and decrease the E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te  resp ec tive ly  to the ex ten t th a t  the imposition or removal coincide w ith  
equ ilib r ium  U.S. in te re s t  ra tes  above the c e i l in g .
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Speculation -  The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f an apprec ia tion  o f a currency r e la t iv e  
to  the d o l la r  w i l l  increase the demand fo r  Euro-dollars  whenever speculators  
fe e l  th a t  i t  is  p r o f i ta b le  to borrow E uro -do lla rs  and convert them in to  the 
strong currency. The re c ip ie n t  o f  the d o l la rs  may convert them or re -d ep o s it  
them in the E u ro -d o lla r  market. I f  the u lt im a te  re c ip ie n t  is  a Central Bank, 
the d o l la rs  may be held as reserves on deposit in  the U.S. or on deposit 
w ith  the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlem ents . I f  the d o l la rs  are deposited  
w ith  the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlem ents , the d o l la r  may be re-deposited  
in  the E u ro -d o lla r  market.
The o r ig in a l  demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla rs  by speculators should tend to 
cause E u ro -d o lla r  ra tes  to increase; however, th is  e f fe c t  may be o f f s e t  by 
re -depos its  o f  the speculative  d o l la r s .  This speculation w i l l  be re fe rre d  to 
as speculation on strong currencies .
The Supply o f  Euro-Dollars
The supply o f Euro-do llars  depends upon the E uro -do lla r  ra te  and the 
fo llo w in g  v a r ia b les :  a l te r n a t iv e  in te r e s t  ra te s ,  the p o te n t ia l  number o f
E u ro -d o l la rs ,  r e s t r ic t io n s  on flows in to  Euro-banks, and specu la tion . These 
fa c to rs  w i l l  be considered in  order.
In te r e s t  Rates -  The q u a n tity  o f  Euro -do llars  supplied, c e te r is  p a r i ­
bus, w i l l  vary d i r e c t ly  with the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and in verse ly  w ith  the 
U.S. and comparable fore ign  ra te .  As in  the case of the demand fo r  Euro­
d o l la r  depos its , the forward premium or discount on fore ign  currencies is  
included in the fo re ign  ra te  to a llow  fo r  hedging against changes in  exchange 
ra te s .
P o te n t ia l  Euro-D o llar  Supply -  The supply o f  E uro -d o lla rs ,  as previously  
discussed in  Chapter I  (p. 7 ) ,  u l t im a te ly  depends on the accummulated United
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States balance of payments gross debits outflows minus d o l la r  returns over 
a period o f time. This f ig u re  includes not ju s t  net debits or d e f ic i t s  but
a l l  d o lla rs  sent abroad which do not re tu rn . I t  is  a stock f ig u r e ,  not a
flow . This stock is  consistent w ith  the steady s ta te  properties  of a supply- 
demand model in which a set of ra tes  are defined and e q u i l ib ra te d  w ith  respect 
to  the volume o f funds and t h e i r  d is t r ib u t io n .  I f  the accumulated debits are  
sub-divided in to  p r iv a te  fo re ign  accumulations and o f f i c i a l  reserve holdings, 
the controvers ia l E u ro -d o lla r  system m u l t ip l ie r  and centra l bank m u l t ip l ie r ,  
discussed in Chapter I ,  could be applied to the respective sub-d iv is ions .  
However, as the existence and s ize  of these m u lt ip l ie rs  are c o n tro v e rs ia l ,
only the aggregated base w i l l  be considered in th is  model. E u ro -d o lla r
deposit supply w i l l  be g reater  and the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  lower the la rg e r  the 
to ta l  accumulated balance o f payments gross debits minus d o l la r  re tu rns .
R estr ic t ions  -  The imposition of re s t r ic t io n s  on flows in to  the Euro­
d o l la r  market reduces the supply o f Euro-dollars  and ra ises  the E uro -do lla r  
r a te .  Two U.S. r e s t r ic t io n s ,  probably, have had the g re a tes t  impact on the 
supply of E u ro -d o lla rs . From la te  1963 u n t i l  February, 1974, the In te re s t  
Equaliza tion  Tax A ct, in e f f e c t ,  imposed a tax upon U.S. c i t iz e n s  on the 
d o l la r  return of any fore ign  secu rity  y ie ld in g  rates above the U.S. r a te ,  
thereby reducing the e f fe c t iv e  fore ign  ra te .  The Voluntary C red it  R es tra in t  
Act o f  1965 l im ite d  the volume o f  loans th a t  U.S. banks could make to  
fo re ig n e rs ,  thereby reducing an in d ire c t  supply o f Euro -do llars  and increasing  
the E uro -do lla r  ra te .
One add itional case of governmental in te r fe ren ce  in c a p ita l  flows 
can be added a t  th is  p o in t ,  although " re s t r ic t io n s "  is  not a p a r t ic u la r ly  
d e sc r ip t iv e  term. This is  the case o f  a fore ign  (Germany) centra l bank
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o ffe r in g  p re fe re n t ia l  rates on d o l la rs .  In 1968 d o lla rs  were sold spot by 
Germany to t h e i r  commercial banks a t  a special discount, equ iva lent to an 
exchange ra te  below the pegged ra te  in terms o f the price o f d o lla rs  in  
fo re ign  currency. Imposition o f th is  negative r e s t r ic t io n  should have 
increased the supply o f Euro-dollars  and decrease Euro-rates.
Speculation on the P o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a Depreciation of a Foreign Currency 
(Weak Currencies) -  Speculation increases the supply of Euro-dollars  when 
the d o l la r  is  used as a safe-harbor currency. In the process o f  speculating  
against currencies which are weak r e la t i v e  to the d o l la r ,  speculators w i l l
convert the weak currencies in to  d o l la rs  on both the spot and forward market.
These d o l la rs  then w i l l  be placed in Euro-banks or U.S. banks depending upon 
the r e la t iv e  in te r e s t  ra tes  o ffe re d .
The source o f  the spot d o l la r  may in p a rt  be withdrawals from the  
E u ro -d o lla r  market as Central Banks draw down balances with the Bank fo r  
In te rn a t io n a l  Settlements or borrow on swap arrangements, both transactions  
possibly representing withdrawals from the E uro -do llar  market.
Based upon the var iab les  discussed above, a supply-demand model can 
be s p ec if ie d  to is o la te  and c r y s ta l iz e  the e f fe c ts  o f  the above var iab les  on 
E u ro -d o lla r  in te r e s t  ra te s . The fo llow ing  symbols w i l l  be used:
Qd = q u a n tity  demanded o f  Euro -do llars
Qs = q u a n tity  supplied o f Euro-do llars
Red = E u ro -d o lla r  ra te
ELD = world loan demand
Rf = comparable fore ign  in te r e s t  ra te
Rus = U.S. in te re s t  ra te
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FDRes = fore ign  r e s t r ic t io n s  on borrowing
FSRes = fore ign  r e s t r ic t io n s  (Negative) on supplying Euro-dollars
USRR = U.S. reserve requirements on borrowings
USD = U.S. re d e f in i t io n  o f demand deposits
USRQ = removal of reg u la t io n  Q c e i l in g
SS = speculation on strong currencies
BP = accumulated gross balance of payments debits  minus d o l la r  returns
V = Voluntary C red it  R es tra in t Act 
I ET = In te re s t  Equa liza tion  Tax Act 
SW = speculation on weak currencies  
The demand function fo r  Euro-dollars  can be s ta ted  in l in e a r  form as fo llow s;
Qd = ttg + a^Red + agRus + a^Rf + a^ELD + a^FORes + a^USRR + a^USD + OgUSRQ +
OgSS
where
a-j<0 a 2 > 0  CX2 > 0  a^>0 ag<0 ag<0 a^<0 ag>0 ctg>0
The supply function is  as fo llow s:
Qs = Bg + B^Red + BgRus + B^Rf + B^ BP + BgV + BglET + B^FSRes + BgSW 
where
Bn>0 B2<0 Bg<0 Bq>0 Bg<0 Bg<0 By>0 Bg>0
Equating E uro -do lla r  demand w ith  Euro-do llar  supply y ie ld s :
ttg + a-|Red + ügRus + ctgRf + a^ELD + OgFDRes + agUSRR + a^USD + agUSRQ + OgSS
B„ + B,Red + euRus + B_Rf + B.BP + B^V + B.IET + B-,FSRes + B„SW 
0 1  c. j  4 b o /  o
Solving fo r  Red, the fo llow ing  manipulation occurs:
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-  P-jRsd = 3q -  9q +(^2 ~ 3 2 ) ^ w s  +  ( 6g -  9q , )R f  -  9^ELD -  9gFDRes -  9gUSRR -
9^USD -  9.USRQ -  9.SS + 3 , BP + 3 .V + 3 . IE T  + g.FSRes + 6_SW 
/ o  y 4 3 0 /  o
y ie ld in g  the fo llo w in g ;
Red = — ---------   -  4 u s  +------------ 4 f  -   ^ L D  -  ----- ^ FDRes -
9-| -  B-] ct-j -  3-| 9-| -  3-j 9-| -  3-j 3-| -  3-j
3g 3y 3n 3g 3^
------------ 5-USRR   USD   USRQ   SS +    BP +
3-, -  6^  9^  -  3^  -  1^ h  -  1^ 1^ -  h
R n 7 n
-V + -----   lET + ------- ^ S R e s  t  ----- ° -----SW
Let
X = ! i i i o  X, = X = X = X .
“ i ■ “ i  ■ “ i ■ ®i “ i ■ ®i “ i -
X = ^ ^ X  = X = - ^ X  = X .
ot-j “ B-j ct-| — B-j ot-| ” B1 ot-j “ B-j ct-| “ B-|
Br g. G. Bn
X = — -------  X =  ^  X =     X -  ^
-  3^  -  3^  ^  ^ -  3^  ^^ -  3^
Then,
Red = X- + x,Rus + x„Rf + x.ELD + x.FDRes + x^USRR + x USD + x^USRQ + x_SS + U I c 3 4 b 0 / o
x^BP + x,_V + x , , IE T  + X,-FSRes + x, SW y lu II 12 10
where
x^>0; XgfO; Xg>0; x^<0; Xg<0; Xg<0; x^>0; Xg>0; Xg<0; x^g>0; x^^>0;
Xi2<0; x-|2<0
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The United States Money Market 
Demand fo r  Funds
The demand fo r  in te r e s t  paying deposits (or e q u iv a le n t ly  the supply 
o f money market instruments) in the U.S. market depends upon the U.S. in te re s t  
ra te  plus loan demand and the r e s t r ic t io n s  on lending abroad. As in  the Euro­
d o l la r  model, the demand fo r  funds in the U.S. market r e f le c ts  loan demand. 
Ceteris  peri bus, loan demand and th e re fo re  deposit demand are an inverse  
function o f U.S. in te r e s t  ra te s .
A d d it io n a l ly ,  demand in the U.S. market depends upon aggregate nom­
inal income in the U.S. and i t s  ra te  o f  growth. Increases in aggregate 
income normally cause increases in loan demand w hile  decreases in income, or 
the ra te  o f growth o f  income, decrease or slow the growth in  loan demand. 
G enera lly , U.S. monetary and f is c a l  p o licy  also a f f e c t  loan demand but prim ar­
i l y  through the p o l ic ie s '  e f fe c ts  on income. However, s e le c t iv e  controls  
have been imposed fo r  balance o f  payment purposes and have a ffe c ted  the 
demand fo r  funds. The imposition o f the Voluntary C re d it  R e s tra in t  
Act and the In te r e s t  Equa liza tion  Tax should have decreased the demand fo r  
funds by diminishing the a b i l i t y  and d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  making loans to  fore igners .  
Because o f  these two exchange c o n tro ls ,  the U.S. market has been r e la t i v e ly  
insu lated  from fo re ig n  and E u ro -d o lla r  in te re s t  ra te  conditions on the demand 
side.
The Supply o f Funds
The supply o f  in te re s t  bearing deposits (or e q u iv a le n t ly  the demand fo r  
money market s e c u r i t ie s )  in the U.S. depends upon U.S. money supply, in te re s t  
ra te s ,  and various re s t r ic t io n s  on both inflows in to  the market and on in te re s t
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ra tes  in the market. Money supply, defined as the sum o f currency and demand 
deposits owned by the non-bank pub lic  (M-j), represents the l i m i t  to the  
supply o f funds in the U.S. market from domestic sources. This monetary 
aggregate is co n tro lled  p r im a r i ly  by Federal Reserve p o licy .  I f  the stance 
of p o licy  is  defined according to i t s  e f f e c t  on money supply (as opposed 
to in te r e s t  r a te s ) ,  then t ig h t  monetary p o licy  r e s t r ic ts  the growth o f  
money supply, thereby reducing the supply o f  deposits and increasing the 
U.S. in te r e s t  ra te .  However, to  the extent th a t  market in te r e s t  rates  
r e f l e c t  the ra te  of p r ice  change, t ig h t  monetary po licy  w i l l  reduce the 
ra te  o f  increase in prices  and th e re fo re  reduce the U.S. in te r e s t  ra te .
The qu an tity  of funds supplied to the U.S. market from both domestic 
n o n -in te re s t  bearing sources^^ and a l l  fo re ign  sources is  d i r e c t ly  re la te d  
to  the U.S. ra te  and in verse ly  re la te d  to both the comparable fo re ign  in te re s t  
ra te  and the E u ro -d o lla r  r a te .  When fo re ig n  in te re s t  y ie ld s ,  including the 
cost o f  forward cover, are high r e la t iv e  to the U.S. r a te ,  the incentive  
fo r  fo re ign  c ap ita l  in f lo w  to the U.S. is  lessened. S im i la r ly ,  the q u an tity  
supplied in the market decreases whenever the Euro-do llar  ra te  is  higher  
than the U.S. ra te .  The cost o f  borrowing Euro-dollars  can become p ro h ib i t iv e ,  
and repayments of previous E u ro -d o lla r  loans can take place.
The borrowing o f  E uro -do lla rs  and, th e re fo re ,  th is  p o te n t ia l  source of  
supply is  a lso a ffe c ted  by U.S. r e s t r ic t io n s .  The imposition o f  reserve
^^Domestic n o n -in te re s t  bearing sources include a l l  p o r t f o l io  holdings 
which do not base t h e i r  y ie ld s  on a f ix e d  coupon. Domestic in te r e s t  bearing  
sources are already absorbed in the market.
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requirements on borrowings and the r e d e f in i t io n  o f  demand deposits fo r  
reserve requirements to include d ra f ts  on Euro-banks decrease the supply of  
funds to the U.S. market. The imposition o f  Regulation Q c e i l in g  in te re s t  
rates tends to increase E uro -do lla r  borrowings and, th e re fo re ,  supply, p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  when U.S. market rates r is e  above the c e i l in g  ra te .  When the c e i l in g  
ra te  is  removed, the borrowing o f  Euro -do lla rs  declines reducing the supply 
of funds and, c e te r is  paribus, ra is in g  the in te r e s t  ra te .  At the same tim e.  
Regulation Q may decrease money supply dom estica lly  through i t s  e f fe c t  on 
average reserve requirement. Consequently, the net e f fe c t  o f th is  regu la tion  
is  unknown.
Based on the above v a r ia b les , a supply-demand model of the U.S. market 
can be spec if ied . The fo llow ing symbols w i l l  be used:
USQd = quantity  demanded fo r  funds (deposits ) in the U.S. money market
USQs = quantity  supplied o f funds in the U.S. money market
Rus = U.S. in te re s t  ra te
USLD = U.S. loan demand
V = Voluntary Cred it  R es tra in t  Act
I ET = In te re s t  Equaliza tion  Tax
USMS = U.S. money supply
Rf = comparable fore ign in te re s t  ra te
Red = Euro-dollar ra te
USRR = reserve requirements on borrowings by U.S. banks 
USD = U.S. r e d e f in i t io n  of demand deposits  
USRQ = Regulation Q
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a' and e ‘ = c o e ff ic ie n ts  fo r  demand and supply in U.S. Markets^^
The demand fo r  funds in the U.S. market can be s ta ted  in l in e a r  form as:
USQd = 0^ + a^Rus + a^USLD + a^V + a^ I^ET
where
a '<0  a '>0  a '<0 a '<0
1 2  3 4
The supply o f funds in the U.S. market can be stated as:
USQs = 6' + g'USMS + 3 ' R u s  + B'Rf + 6 ' Red + B'USRR + 3 ' USD + 3 'USRQ
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
where 3 '>0 3 ‘ >0 3'<0 3 '<0 3 '<0 3 '<0 3' = ?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Equating supply with demand y ie ld s :
a' + a'Rus + a'USLD + a'V + a ' lE T  = 3' + 3'USMS + 3'Rus + 3 'R f  + 3 'Red +
0 1  2 3 4  0 1  2 3 4
3 'USRR + 3'USD + 3'USRQ 
5 6 7
Solving fo r  Rus:
alRus -  3 ^^us = 3q -  3q -  S^USLD -  3^V - 3^IET + 3 jUSMS + 3^Rf + B^Red +
3'USRR + 3'USO + 3'USRQ 
5 6 7
The consequent reduced form is :
Rus = -  - 1 È  USLD -   V -   ^i— IET +-------^ — USMS +  IRf +
3-j ~ ^2 1^ ~ ^2 ^j ~ ^2 1^ ” ^2 1^ ~ ^2 1^ " ^2
H  ^5 By
-------------Red +--------------USRR +  USD +  USRQ
3j -  B; 3j -  %  3j -  B; 3j -  B;
Let
3q -  3q -^2 "^3 “ 1^y„ =  U y , =  5----- y„ = ------- ± _  yg =  =-----Y a = -------- —
3j - 31 3j -  3A 3j -  BA 3j -  BA 3j -  BA
c J Ci J n JO J Q
^ 3j  -  3^  ^ 9j -  Bg 3j  -  B^  Ü 3j  -  3  ^  ^ 3j  -  B^
J^The prime symbols w i l l  be used to d is tingu ish  between the three markets: 
no prime fo r  c o e ff ic ie n ts  in the E u ro -d o lla r  market, a s in g le  prime fo r  co­
e f f i c ie n t s  in the U.S. market, and a double prime fo r  c o e f f ic ie n ts  in the fore ign  
market.
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Then,
Rus = y + y USLD + y V + y I  ET + y USMS + y Rf + y Red y USRR + 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ygUSD + ygUSRQ 
where
y^>0 y2<0 yg<0 y^= ? yg>0 yg>0 yy>0 yg>0 y^ = ?
The Foreign Market 
Demand fo r  Funds
The demand fo r  funds in  the fo re ign  market depends upon loan demand, 
in te r e s t  ra te s ,  forward r a te s ,  and speculation. The fo re ign  demand fo r  
deposit funds is  a d i r e c t  func tion  o f loan demand which in  turn depends 
p r im a r i ly  upon the leve l and ra te  o f growth o f aggregate nominal income. The 
demand fo r  deposits should increase w ith  increased loan demand and higher 
fo re ig n  in te r e s t  ra te s .
Foreign demand is  also a function  o f  in te re s t  rates and forward ra te s .  
The demand fo r  funds from the v iewpoint^of the fo re ign  market is  an inverse  
function  o f  fo re ign  rates and is  a d i r e c t  function o f  what can be termed 
comparable U.S. and E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .  The term comparable U.S. and Euro­
d o l la r  ra tes  re fe rs  to the fo re ig n  market t ra n s la t io n  o f  the two d o l la r  rates  
in to  the fore ign  equ iva len t in te r e s t  rates by including the cost o f  forward 
cover. The inc lus ion  o f  the cost o f  forward cover e lim inates  exchange r is k  
as a fa c to r  in comparing the fo re ign  interest, ra te  to o ther ra te s .
F in a l ly ,  the demand fo r  funds is  a function of speculation on the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  devaluation o f  the fo re ig n  currency. I f  the fo re ig n  currency 
is  considered weak, demand w i l l  increase and in te re s t  ra tes  w i l l  r is e  as 
speculators borrow to convert in to  stronger currencies. I f  the currency is
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strong, speculators w i l l  not en ter the market on the demand s ide.
Supply of Funds
The supply o f funds to the fore ign  market depends on fo re ign  money 
supply, the fo re ign  r a te ,  comparable in te r e s t  ra te s ,  and speculation flows. 
The supply o f  funds is  a d i r e c t  function  o f money supply and the fo re ign  
in te r e s t  ra te .  Funds supplied are an inverse function  o f the comparable 
E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and the comparable U.S. ra te .  Foreign in te r e s t  ra tes  
are lower when comparable U.S. and E u ro -d o lla r  ra tes  are r e la t i v e ly  low.
Speculation on strong fo re ig n  currenc ies , as mentioned above, w i l l  
increase the supply o f  funds to  fo re ig n  markets as speculators convert 
d o lla rs  in to  the fo re ig n  currency in expectation o f a reva lu a t io n  o f  the  
currency r e la t iv e  to the d o l la r .  Such speculation w i l l  tend to decrease the  
ra te  of in te re s t  in the fo re ig n  market.
Based on the above v a r ia b le s ,  a supply-demand model can be s p e c if ie d .
The fo llow ing  symbols w i l l  be used:
FQd = demand fo r  funds in the fore ign  market 
FQs = supply of funds in the fo re ig n  market 
FLD = fore ign  loan demand
Rf = fore ign  comparable in te r e s t  ra te  in d o l la r  terms 
FX = the premium or discount on forward exchange 
Rf -  FX = the nominal fo re ign  in te r e s t  ra te  
Rus = U.S. in te re s t  ra te
Rus - FX = the comparable U.S. in te r e s t  ra te  from the view point o f  the 
fo re ign  market 
Red = E u ro -d o lla r  in te r e s t  ra te
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Red -  FX = the comparable E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  from the viewpoint of the 
fo re ign  market 
FMS = fore ign  money supply 
SS = speculation on strong currencies  
SW = speculation on weak currencies
The demand fo r  funds in  the fore ign market can be stated as; 
a!j and = c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r  demand and supply in the fo re ign  market. 
FQd = aJJ + a'TLD + a^(Rf -  FX) + o^(Rus -  FX) + a^(Red -  FX) + cx^ SW 
where
a"  0 ct" 0 a"  0 a"  0 a"  0
1 2 3 4 5
The supply can be s ta ted  as
FQs = 6% + 6"(FMS) + g%(Rf -  FX) + B:(Rus -  FX) + B'^Red -  FX) + B"SS 
U 1 2 o 4 D
where
B" 0 B" 0 B" 0 B" 0 B" 0
1 2 3 4 5
Equating supply and demand:
ag + alj'FLD + a^(Rf -  FX) + a^(Rus -  FX) + aJ(Red + FX) + a^SW =
Bg + B!|'(FMS) + B%(Rf -  FX) + B^(Rus - FX) + Bj{Red -  FX) + BgSS
Solving fo r  Rf -  FX, the fo re ign  in te re s t  ra te  y ie ld s :
■9" -  3" -  a 'T L D  + (b" -  a " ) (Rus -  FX) + (b" - 9  ")(Red -  FX) + B"FMS0 0 1 
a"SW + B"SSD b
and f i n a l l y
B" -  a" a'' B: -  a^ a)|
(Rf -  FX) = — ------- -------------— FLD + —  ^(Rus -  FX) + —  -(Red - FX) +
« 2  -  Bg a" -B^ « 2  -  gg “ 2 ■ ^2
3'' a" B"
  FMS 2 SW + ------5------SS
a" -  B" a" -  B" a" -  B"
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which is  the reduced form fo r  the fo re ig n  in te re s t  ra te .  This s p e c if ic a t io n  
can be stated in terms o f the comparable fore ign  ra te  by adding the forward 
premium to both sides o f the equation. The r e s u l t  shows the determinants o f  
the comparable fo re ign  ra te .
B" -  9"  a "  B"  -  3"  6"  -  9"  B"
Rf = - 5  Q. -  ------]------FLD +----- ------- ^(Rus -  FX) + ------- ^{Red - FX) + ------]------FMS -
«2 -  '2  *2  -  ^2 «2 -  ^2 -  ^2 -  9%
a" B"
5 SW + ___ 5___ SS + FX
«2 -  ^2 -  ^2
or
^0 ’  ^0 “ Ï  _ ^3 '  S ,  , ^4 '  ^4, , 1^
'  c," -  B“ ■ a" -  _ j 4 R l is )  T _ g.(Red) + .  g.fUS -
b; b;  -  3" + b;  -  3J + s;  -  b;
SW + ___ 5___ SS +  3____ 4____ 4____ 2____ 2 px
.  2 -G , *2  -  a ; -
Let the fo llow ing  d e f in i t io n  hold
“S -  4 '  «3 -  ^3
2  =    z =    Z  =    Z  =    Z =  --------------------
0 a"  -  B"  ^ a ” -  B" ^ ct" -  B" ^ a"  -  B"  ^  a"  -  S"
2 2  2 2  2 2  2 2  2 2
Z  =  - 0 5  Z  =  GS Z  =  G 5  -  3 ]  +  G% -  9% +  3% -  B2
a j  -  Bg ct^  -B 2 -  Bg
Then,
Rf = Zq + z^FLD + ZgRus + z^Red + z^FMS (3 ) + z^SW + z^SS + z^ FX 
where
z,>0  z„>0 z_>0 z.?0 Zr>0 z ,<0  z^<0
I d J H 0 0 /
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The Estimating Equations
The three markets formulated above are c lo s e ly  re la te d .  While there  
is  no id e n t i f ic a t io n  problem, in te r e s t  rates are common in  a l l  three markets. 
Other variab les  are e i th e r  common to two o f the markets or are in a functional  
re la t io n s h ip  to a common v a r ia b le .  While the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f each in d iv id u a l  
var ia b le  is  key to understanding the E u ro -d o lla r  market, the question asked 
in  th is  d is s e r ta t io n  is  one o f the r e la t iv e  s ig n if ic a n ce  o f the U.S. market 
and fore ign market to the E uro -do lla r  market.
This d is s e r ta t io n  hypothesizes th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  r a te ,  as an i n t e r ­
national r a te ,  can be conceived as the opportunity  cost ra te  fo r  a l l  other  
equiva lent in te r e s t  rates in the world. As such, the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  can 
be compared with a l l  other in te re s t  ra tes  o f s im i la r  r isks  o f devault to 
i l l i q u i d i t y  (the  l a t t e r  are re fe rred  to  as country r is k s ) .  Consequently, 
movements in the E uro -do lla r  ra te  should r e f l e c t  movements in the highest 
comparable in te r e s t  ra te  amongst comparable s e c u r i t ie s  in the world.
In contrast to th is  hypothesis, the E u ro -d o lla r  market is  usually  
considered as an extension or adjunct to the United States market. Although 
th is  a l te rn a t iv e  premise has never been te s te d , i t  is  im p l ic i t  in many studies
07
of the E u ro -d o lla r  market.
A th i rd  a l te rn a t iv e  hypothesis is  th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  a 
function of U.S. rates and a weighted average o f  fo re ign  in te re s t  ra te s .  This 
is  the essence o f Kwack's study.
Testing the hypothesis th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  more c lo se ly  
re la te d  to the highest comparable ra te  than to U.S. ra tes  w i l l  proceed
37$ee Hendershott, Kwack and Black as discussed in Chapter I I .
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employing the fo llow ing  framework: A l l  equations used to estimate the models
presented above w i l l  be tested by both ordinary and generalized le a s t  squares 
estim ation. The In te re s t  E qua liza tion  Tax w i l l  be excluded because i t  was 
in  e f fe c t  fo r  the e n t i re  period to be tes ted . Q u arte r ly  seasonal adjustment 
variab les  (Q i) w i l l  be added to the equation. These seasonal variab les  
should in d ica te  the extent to which the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  a ffec ted  by 
fore ign  banks "padding" of t h e i r  accounts a t  the end o f the year.^^
The E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  w i l l  f i r s t  be estimated from a modified form o f  
the E uro -do lla r  model (Equation 1) presented above. Thus, the estim ating  
equation w i l l  be:
Red = Xq + x-|Rus + X2 Rf + x^FDRes + XgUSRR + XgUSD + x^USQR + XgSS + XgBP + 
XigV + x^gFSRes + x^^SW + x^^Q^ + x^gQ^ + x^gQ^
Two series o f  regressions w i l l  be using th is  E u ro -d o lla r  market model to  
in d ica te  the r e la t iv e  s ig n if ic a n ce  o f the U.S. and comparable highest in te re s t  
ra tes .
The c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  the determinants o f the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  w i l l  also  
be estimated in equations derived from the U.S. money market and fore ign  
market models. Thus, i f  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  hypothesized to be a U.S. 
money market ra te  and
Rus = yg + y^USLD + ygV + y^USMS + y^Rf + y^Red + ygUSRR + y^USD + 
ygUSRQ,
^%ank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlem ents, Annual Report, 1967.
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then, by s u b s t i tu t io n
Vq y■^  ^2 ^3 ^4
Red -  -------------+  USLD +  USLD + --^ S M S  + ----------- Rf +
1 -  YS 1 -  yg 1 -  Yg 1 -  ^5 1 -  ^5
 USRR +  ^ ^ S D  +------- ----- USRQ
1 -  ys 1 -  yg 1 -  ^5
S im i la r ly ,  i f  the the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  hypothesized to be equal to the highest 
comparable ra te  and the highest comparable r a t e ,R f  is ;
Rf = Zq + z-|FLD + Z2 RUS + ZgRed + z^FMS + ZgSW + ZgSS + ZyFX. 
then,
Zn Z -1 Z o  Zfl Z r
Red = ----- —  +------- -— FLD +  ^ u s  + —  FMS + ------— SW +
1 -  Zg 1 -  Z ,  1 -  Zg 1 -  Zg l '  Z^
^ 6  SS + _ i Z _ F X
1 -  Z3  1 -  Z3
In te s t in g  the E u ro -d o l la r 's  ro le  in the two markets, the regression c o e f f ic ie n ts  
w i l l  be composites of the above fu n c tio n . Dummies fo r  q u a r te r ly  seasonal v a r ia ­
t io n  w i l l  a lso be included. Consequently, the estim ating  equations w i l l  be:
Red = y [  + y Iru s  + y^USLD + y \  + yluSMS + y^Rf + y^USRR + y^USD + y USRQ +
U l  d O H  D o  /  O
y 9^2 ^10^3 ^11^4
Red = z  ^ + zV l D + z^Rus + zV mS + z^SW + z^SS + z V x  + z^Q + z \  + z^Q 
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 2 8 3 9 4
An a d d it io n a l te s t  w i l l  estimate the c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f fa c to rs  a f fe c t in g  
the E u ro -d o lla r  -  U.S. d i f f e r e n t ia l  r e la t iv e  to the U.S. -  fo re ign  d i f f e r e n t i a l .
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This te s t  w i l l  eva luate  fac to rs  which a f fe c t  changes in the alignment of  
the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  w ith  U.S. and fore ign  comparable ra te s . The re s u lts  w i l l  
in d ica te  the d ire c t io n  o f  alignment caused by the d i f f e r e n t  var iab les  speci­
f ie d .  The estim ating equation is  derived by f i r s t  su b st itu t in g  the determin­
ants o f Rus and Rf in to  the estim ating equation as fo llow s:
Red = Xm +  X .  (y^ + y^USLD + y .V  + y^USMS + y .R f  + y -^Red + y.USRR + y_USD +
( J I U I  C O  4 3 D /
ygUSRQ) + X g tZ g  + z^FLD + z^Rus + z^Red + z^FMS + z^SW + z^SS + z ^ F X )  + 
x^FDRes + XgUSRR + XgUSD + x^USQR + XgSS + XgBP + x -jqV + x^gFSRes + x^^SW +
*14^2 *15^3 ^16^4'
Gathering terms, d iv id in g  by (1 -  x y -  x z ) ,  and solving fo r  Red y ie ld s  
the fo llo w in g :
Red = [Xg + x^(yg + y^USLD + y^V + y^USMS + y^Rf + y^US + y^USD + ygUSRQ) + 
X2 (zq + z-jFLD + Z2 RUS + z^FMS + ZgSW + ZgSS + ZyFX) + x^FDRes + XgUSRR -t- 
X USD + x^USQR + XgSS + XgBP + x^^V + x^^FSRes + x^^SW + x^^Q^ + x^^Q^ +
"  (1  -  *1^5 -  X2 Z3 )
Subtracting Rus from both sides and d iv id in g  both sides by Rf -  Rus y ie ld s '
R f - Y u r ~ " ^^0 -  * 1 ( ^ 0  ^lUSLD + 7 2  ^ + YgUSMS + y^Rf + y^USRR + y^USD +
ygUSRQ) + XgfZg + z^FLD + ZgRus + z^FMS + ZgSW + ZgSS + z^FX) + x^FDRes +
XgUSRR + XgUSD + xyjSQR + XgSS + XgBP + x^^V + x^gFSRes + x^^SW + x^^Q +
*15^3 *16^4 "
Rus]
(Rf -  Rus) (1 -  x^yg - XgZg)
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A l in e a r  approximation to th is  equation can be s ta ted  as fo llow s:
Red -  Rus  ^ + c,USLD + c.FLD + c.USMS + c /M S  + c^V + c^USRR + c^USD +
Rf -  Rus 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CgUSQR +  CgSW +  c ^ g S S  +  c ^ ^ F D R e s  +  c ^ g B P  +  c ^ ^ F S R e s  +  +
^15^3 ^16^4
In add ition  to the above regressions, Chow tes ts  are run on the Euro­
d o l l a r - d i f f e r e n t ia l  - r a t i o  equation (Equation V, page 60) to determine i f  
there has been a s h i f t  in the s tru c tu re  o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market. F in a l ly ,  
the s e n s i t iv i t y  o f  in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  is  tested using the Branson 
study as the format. The responsiveness o f in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  to changes 
in  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and the U.S. ra te  are compared on an instantaneous and 
lagged basis to see f i r s t ,  i f  there has been any change in  resu lts  since 
the Branson data and, second, i f  there is  any d if fe re n c e  in responsiveness 
to  changes in E u ro -d o lla r  ratesas opposed to changes in U.S. rates.
CHAPTER IV 
THE DATA
Data on the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  are from the Bank o f England Q uarterly  
B u l le t in . The rates are the end o f  the month, middle closing rates paid 
on 90 day deposits. P r io r  to October, 1965, these rates were the la s t  
Thursday closing ra te s ;  a f t e r  th is  date, they are the Friday closing  
ra te s .  Data on a l l  other in te r e s t  rates come from the Federal Reserve 
B u l le t in . The ra tes  selected from th is  l a t t e r  source are the monthly 
average n inety  day rates fo r  the U.S. treasury b i l l s ,  the 90 day ra te  
fo r  United Kingdom Treasury b i l l s ,  the monthly average day-to-day money 
ra te  fo r  France, the end o f the month ra te  on German Treasury b i l l s  and 
the monthly average 90 day treasury  b i l l  fo r  the Netherlands. The treasury  
b i l l  ra te  and equivalents were choosen to approximate the r is k  fre e  
in te r e s t  ra te  in each country. A ll  in te re s t  rates cover the period  
u u ly , 1964 through November, 1970 in c lu s ive .  The fore ign  comparable 
in te r e s t  ra te  is  ca lcu la ted  by adding the premium or subtracting  
the discount on d o l la r  forward exchange from the ra te  o f  in te r e s t  in  
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Netherlands and comparing 
th is  ra te  w ith  the U.S. ra te .  The highest of the f iv e  re s u lt in g  ra te s .
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fo r  each period o f time is  employed to obta in  the highest comparable 
ra te  s e r ie s .  I t  should be noted th a t  in constructing th is  s e r ie s ,  
the U.S. ra te  appears only once during the period in ves tiga ted .
The comparable rates and th e i r  country o f  o r ig in  are found in  Appendix I I - B .
In two estimations o f  the E u ro -d o l la r  market model, an average 
comparable fo re ign  in te re s t  ra te  is  used. This ra te  is  c a lcu la ted  
by weighting the in te re s t  rates o f  France, Germany, the United King­
dom and Netherlands by t h e i r  q u a r te r ly  d o l la r  asset claimed against  
non-residents  o f the ten major countries  in Europe and averaging the re s u lts .  
Appendix I I - C  shows the d o l la r  assets and weights derived from the  
assets . To th is  average in te r e s t  r a te ,  an average forward exchange ra te  
(exp la ined  below) is added. The data source o f  the weighting fac tors  
is  the  Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l Settlements Annual Reports.
Forward exchange premiums and discounts are the annualized  
n in e ty  day ra tes  reported in the In te rn a t io n a l  Monetary Fund F inancial  
S t a t i s t i c s . The series is  poor. There are several inconsistencies  
in  going from month to month in the o r ig in a l  data which have been 
resolved by averaging the two d i f f e r e n t  reported rates fo r  the same 
month. The average forward ra te  is  ca lcu la ted  by weighting the forward 
premiums o f  France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Netherlands by each 
country 's  q u a r te r ly  d o l la r  l i a b i l i t i e s  v is -a -v is  non-residents o f  the ten 
major European countries as reported by the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlements  
Annual Reports. These data and the weights derived are found in  Appendix I I - C .
U.S. and fore ign  money supply data are from the In te rn a t io n a l  
Monetary Fund Financial S t a t is t ic s .  Monthly rates o f increase in money
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supply are used to  approximate the U.S. money supply. The ra te  o f  increase  
was used in order to employ consis tent da ta . Only percentage monetary data 
were a v a i la b le  fo r  France. Foreign money supply is  ca lcu lated  by averaging  
the monthly ra tes  o f increase in  money supply fo r  France, Germany and the  
Netherlands, and the q u a r te r ly  ra tes  o f  increase fo r  the United Kingdom 
fo r  each month in the q u arte r .
Money supply data fo r  the E u ro -d o l la r  market are very l im ite d .  To 
avoid double counting a l l  interbank deposits  should be netted ou t. However, 
estimates o f  the s ize  o f  the E u ro -d o l la r  market ne tt in g  out a l l  interbank  
deposits are only a v a i la b le  fo r  the year-end fo r  a l im ite d  number o f  years. 
While more frequent f ig u re s  are a v a i la b le  fo r  the external pos it ions  of  
European banks v is -a -v is  non-residents o f  the ins ide  area (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, Germany, I t a l y ,  N etherlands, Sweden, Sw itzer land ,  
and the United Kingdom), there is  no n e tt in g  out when funds are le n t  
to outside area banks and redeposited by the l a t t e r  with banks w ith in  
the reporting  area. Consequently, an approximation o f the E u ro -d o lla r  
money supply base, or accumulated d eb its  minus d o l la r  returns discussed 
in Chapter I ,  pages 5 -  8 is made. The l i q u i d i t y  balance o f  payments 
position  as reported in the Federal Reserve B u l le t in  has been used as 
an estim ate o f the ra te  o f  growth o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  money base and, hence. 
E u ro -d o lla r  money supply.
U.S. loan demand is  approximated by the monthly U.S. Gross National 
Product f ig u res  reported in the Federal Reserve B u l le t in .  These data  
are probably the best in d ica to r  o f  the s ta te  o f  the economic a c t i v i t y  
upon which U.S. loan demand depends. Foreign loan demand f ig u re s  are
-48-
not qu ite  as c le a r  cu t.  F i r s t ,  there  is  a problem of aggregating the  
GNP's of various countries  because o f exchange rates and changes in  
exchange ra te s .  Second, there  is  i n s u f f i c ie n t ,  in  one case, and 
s p o ra t ic ,  in another case, reporting  o f data in the countries covered 
in  th is  study. As a r e s u l t ,  fo re ign  loan demand is  approximated by 
averaging the q u a r te r ly  ra tes  o f growth in GNP fo r  the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, and Germany and constructing from th is  average an index  
using the t h i r d  q u arte r  o f  1964 as the base period.
Speculation var iab les  are approximated by dummy variab les . Two 
data series  have been generated: one representing devaluation c r is i s
and one representing  reva lu at io n  c r is is .  In both series the c r is is  
periods are  represented by ones and the n o n -c r is is  periods by zero.
Speculation against weak currencies includes the S te r l in g  Crises ( 6 / 6 6  -  
8 / 6 6  in c lu s iv e ) ,  (4 /67  -  6 /67  in c lu s iv e ) ,  and (9 /67  -  devaluation o f  
11/67) and the franc  crises (5 /68  - 10 /68 ) and (7 /69  - 1 0 /69 ) .  Spec­
u la t io n  on strong currencies includes (1 0 /6 7 )  and (7 /69  -  10 /69) both 
periods representing  Deutsch mark c r is e s .  I t  should be stressed th a t  a l l  
o f these dates are approximations. There is  no procedure fo r  measuring crises;  
however, the dummy v ar iab les  should g ive some in d ica tio n  of the importance 
o f  speculation .
In a s im i la r  manner, most re s t r ic t io n s  are represented by dummy 
variab les  where ones ( 1 ) represent the time when the r e s t r ic t io n  is  in  
e f fe c t  and zeros (0 )  when i t  is  not in e f f e c t .  There are two r e s t r i c ­
tions imposed by fo re ig n  countries which have been considered-German 
o ffe r in g  o f  d o l la rs  a t  p re fe re n t ia l  ra tes  is  included fo r  November and
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December, 1967. And German reserve requirements on fore ign  l i a b i l i t i e s  
are included fo r  A p r i l  -  May, 1970.
The U.S. Voluntary C re d it  R es tra in t Program is  represented by an 
index of loans a llowable over and above the f i r s t  q u a r te r ,  1964 base 
period39. pummy var iab les  represent the imposition o f reserve re q u ire ­
ments on E u ro -d o lla r  borrowings and the change in the d e f in i t io n  o f  
demand deposits both e f fe c t iv e  October, 1969 as well as the l i f t i n g  o f  
the Regulation Q c e i l in g  in te r e s t  ra te  in January, 1970.
S^Black op. c i t .  p. 85.
CHAPTER V 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The hypothesis th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  an in te rn a t io n a l  
opportunity  cost ra te ,  derived from the highest comparable in te re s t  
ra te  is  substantiated in the f ind ings  discussed below. In the f i r s t  
two sets o f regressions ( I  and I I ) ,  the Euro-do llar  ra te  is  viewed 
in  re la t io n s h ip  to the s truc tu re  o f the Euro-do llar  market model. Here 
the resu lts  d i r e c t ly  confirm the basic hypothesis. At th is  p o in t ,  
a comparison is  made between the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  viewed as p a rt  o f  
the U.S. market (regressions I I I )  and the Euro-do llar  ra te  viewed as 
p a rt  o f  the fo re ign  market (regressions IV ) .  Again, the find ings are  
consistent w ith  the highest comparable ra te  hypothesis.
The variab les  responsible fo r  the Euro-do llar  ra te  alignment w ith  
the highest comparable ra te  are studied in regressions V. The find ings  
in d ica te  th a t  re s t r ic t io n s  have played the most s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  in the 
alignment o f  in te re s t  ra tes . At th is  p o in t,  a Chow te s t  is undertaken to 
confirm th a t  the alignment o f Euro-rates with the highest comparable 
ra te  represents a s ig n if ic a n t  s h i f t  in the s tructure  of the Market. Given 
a ff irm a t io n  of the s h i f t ,  two comparisons of the E u ro -d o lla r  and the  
U.S. r a te 's  e f fe c t  on other in te r e s t  rates are undertaken.
The general format fo r  discussing each regression is  to  consider 
f i r s t  the o vera ll  re s u lts ,  and then to consider the in te r e s t  ra te  f ind ings
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in re la t io n s h ip  to the basic hypothesis. The s ig n if ic a n ce  o f r e s t r ic t io n s
is  then considered followed by a discussion o f  other var iab les  in declin ing
of s ig n if ic a n ce .
An ordinary le a s t  squares regression was run on the basic E u ro -d o lla r  
market in te re s t  ra te  equation using the highest comparable fore ign  
in te r e s t  ra te  series as a proxy fo r  the fo re ig n  in te r e s t  ra te .  The 
re su lts  are as fo llow s:
Red = .0616 + .9061 Rf + .2184 Rus + .0001 BP + .0768 SW
standard e rro r  .4046 .0906 .09165 .0001 .1733
( t -v a lu e s )  ( .1 5 2 3 )(9 .9 9 2 0 )  (2 .3859) ( .5 514 ) ( .4430 )
+ .2019 SS + .2490 FDRes -  .0706 FSRes - .0016 V
.3977 .4988 .3202 .0024 ( I -A )
( .507 7 ) ( .4991 ) ( .2204 ) ( .6732 )
-  .2278 USRR + .0696 USD -  .3737 USRQ -  .0948 Qg 
.3751 .4886 .4468 .1603
( .6073 ) (.1424 ) ( .8366 ) ( .5914 )
-  .0712 Q3  + .2686 Q4  
.1568 .1551
( .4540 ) (1 .7317)
n = 76 R^  = .9522 DW = 2.5107 SE = .4596
Because the Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c  ind icated  a u to c o rre la t io n ,  a second 
regression using the generalized le a s t  squares procedure was run in  
order to reduce the e f fe c ts  o f au to co rre la t io n  and produce estimates
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which are unbiased and have sm aller variences.^^ The re s u lts  were as 
fo llow s:
Red = .02561 + .8424 Rf + .2952 Rus + .0001 BP
standard e r ro r  .3291 .0872 .0868 .0001
( t -v a lu e )  ( .0776 ) (9 .6589) (3 .4003) (1 .1456)
+ .0857 SW -  .0211 S3 + .3850 FDRes + .0455 FSRes
.1559 .3730 .4777 .3097
( .5494 ) ( .0567 ) ( .8 06 0 )  ( .1470 )
-  .0016 V -  .2627 USRR + .5141 USD -  .7398 USRQ ( I -B )
.0019 .3388 .4541 .4026
( .8163 ) (1 .7753) (1 .1322) (1 .8378)
-  .0460 Qg - .0236 Q3  + .3321 Q^
.1370 .1298 .1299
(.336 0 ) ( .1822 ) (2 .5573)
n = 75 R^  = .9718 DW = 2.3455 SE = .4386
As can be seen from the t -v a lu e s ,  the comparable fo re ig n  in te r e s t  
r a te ,  the U.S. ra te  and the fou rth  quarte r  seasonal adjustment va r ia b le  
and d e f in a te ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the 1 % leve l and the signs are as expected.
The s u b s ta n t ia l ly  higher t - s t a t i s t i c  fo r  the highest comparable fore ign  in te re s t  
ra te  r e la t iv e  to the U.S. in te r e s t  ra te  s trong ly  supports the proposition  
th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is  a world opportunity  cost r a t e ,  competitive
40
Edward Kane, Economic S ta t is t ic s  and Econometrics (New York: Harper
and Row, 1968) p. 359.
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with the highest e f fe c t iv e  or comparable in te r e s t  ra te s . The c o e f f ic ie n t  
fo r  the highest comparable ra te  is  much higher than fo r  the U.S. ra te .  
A d d it io n a l ly ,  the c o e f f ic ie n t  fo r  Rf is  not f a r  from 1 which is ,  in  
e f f e c t ,  hypothesized.
Of the variab les  representing r e s t r ic t io n s  on the supply and demand 
fo r  Euro-dollars  only two are worth noting. The removal o f  regu lation  
Q c e i l in g  in te re s t  ra tes  is  m arg ina lly  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the 5% leve l and is  
of negative sign as pred icted . The sign is  in d ic a t iv e  th a t  the removal o f  
the in te re s t  ra te  l i m i t  decreased U.S. demand fo r  Euro-do llars  and, th e re fo re ,  
lowered in te re s t  ra te s . The va r ia b le  representing the r e d e f in i t io n  
of U.S. demand deposits to include d ra f ts  on Euro-banks is  of minimal 
s ig n if ican ce  (a t  the 25% le v e l )  and the sign is  in co n s is ten t w ith the 
pred ic t io n . The sign seems to in d ica te  th a t  U.S. borrowings of Euro­
do lla rs  to meet reserve requirements depends more on the amount o f
funds a v a i la b le  fo r  reserves than upon the in te r e s t  ra te  on borrowing Euro­
d o l la r  week-end reserves; thus, the decrease in excess reserves due to  the
re d e f in i t io n  o f demand deposits increased demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla rs . A
s im ila r  explanation can be made fo r  the sign on the reserve requirement 
c o e f f ic ie n ts .  But, in other regressions, th is  sign is  as predicted so 
th a t  the large standard e r ro r  fo r  the reserve requirement v a r ia b le  must 
be considered to be responsible fo r  the sign.
The s ig n i f ic a n t  and p o s it ive  value fo r  the fo u rth  quarter support 
ind icates  th a t  E u ro -d o lla r  are borrowed to increase or pad fore ign banks 
l iq u id i t y  positions fo r  year-end rep o rt in g . The balance o f payments 
v a r ia b le  is  of s ig n if ic a n ce  only a t  the 25% leve l probably due to the
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inadequacy o f  these data as a proxy fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  money supply, 
i . e .  accumulated debits  minus d o l la r  re flow s. However, the sign fo r  
th is  v a r ia b le  is consistent w ith the hypothesis th a t  increases in the  
u lt im a te  source of E u ro -d o lla r  supply (roughly ind icated  by d e f ic i t s  
in  the balance of payment^ are consistent w ith  lower E u ro -d o lla r  rates  
and decreases in supply (approximated by balance of payments surpluses) 
and consistent with higher E u ro -d o lla r  ra tes .
The remaining var iab les  are a l l  in s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the 25% le v e l .
However, i t  should be noted th a t  the signs o f the two speculative  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  show th a t  speculation on weak currencies represents a 
decrease in supply or increase in demand fo r  Euro-dollars  and th a t  
speculation on strong currencies has the opposite e f fe c t .  This r e s u l t  
may be due to uncovered operations. Borrowing o f Euro -do llars  could 
increase in  devaluation speculation because the uncovered E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te  is  lower than the (uncovered) domestic fo re ign  ra te .  In the same 
v e in , borrowing might decrease and depositing might increase when reva luation  
is  a p o s s ib i l i ty  because o f the r e la t i v e ly  low uncovered in te re s t  rates  
in  the p o te n t ia l ly  reva lu ing  country. A d d i t io n a l ly ,  as previously  
mentioned, to the ex ten t th a t  central banks borrow Euro-dollars  to 
supplement th e i r  reserve during devaluation crises  and deposit with  
Euro-banks or the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l Settlements (which in turn  
deposits in the E u ro -d o lla r  market) when reserves are excessive, the  
signs o f the c o e f f ic ie n ts  can be j u s t i f i e d .
The sign fo r  the voluntary  c re d i t  r e s t r a in t  program v a r ia b le  is
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unexpected. The sign can be explained as the re s u l t  o f la rge  leakages 
of funds to the E uro -do lla r  market despite the r e s t r a in t  program. However, 
the standard e rro r  is high; the c o e f f ic ie n t  could be zero.
A second set o f  regressions was run on the basic E u ro -d o lla r  market 
equation. This time the average fore ign  comparable in te r e s t  ra te  was 
used to represent the fo re ign  r a te .  The resu lts  are as fo llow s:
Red = 1.0696 + .7837 Rus + .0734 Rfav + .0001 BP
standard e rro r  .6311 .1194 .0363 .0002
( t -v a lu e )  (1 .89 4 9 )(6 .5 6 23 )  (2 .0240) ( .4115 )
+ .4022 SW -  .4143 SS -  .0031 FDRes + .4156 FSRes
.2730 .6189 .7836 .5044
(1 .4732) (.6694) ( .0040 ) ( .8240)
( I I - A )
+ .0033 V + .9531 USRR + 1.9783 USD -  1.4042 USRQ 
.3687 .5561 .7062 .6842
(.8927) (1 .7138) (2 .8013) (2 .0523)
+ .1830 Qg + .1347 Q + .4915 
.2484 .2450 .2413
(.7370 ) ( .5497 ) (2 .0367)
n = 76 Rg = .8819 DW = 2.4519 SE = .7225 
As in the previous case, a u to -c o rre la t io n  appears. Consequently, the 
equation was re-estim ated using generalized lease squares. The GLS procedure 
y ie lded  the fo llow ing:
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Red = .8607 + .8738 Rus + .0550 Rfax + .0001 BP + .4144 SW
standard value .5214 .1006 .0343 .0001 .2447
( t -v a lu e )  (1 .6 5 0 5 ) (8 .6 8 4 7 )  (1 .6020) ( .9863) (1 .6934)
-  .4825 SS + .1911 FDR + .7072 FSR + .0025 V
.5842 .7511 .4816 .0030
( - .8 2 6 0 )  ( .2545 ) (1 .4683) ( .8 36 0 )
+ .6245 USRR + 2.4914 USD -  1.7976 USRQ + .2071 Qg ( I I - B )
.5149 .6383 .6118 .2135
(1 .2131) (3 .9035) ( -2 .9 38 1 )  ( .9 70 0 )
+ .1626 + .5365
.2050 .2040
(.7929 ) (2 .6293)
n = 75 Rg = .9277 DW = 2.3937 SE = .6864 
The use o f  an average comparable fo re ign  in te r e s t  ra te  has ra ised the 
standard e r ro r  o f  the regression and consequently lowered the R-squared 
r e la t iv e  to the re su lts  using the highest comparable ra te  s e r ie s .  
A d d it io n a l ly ,  the U.S. ra te  now appears more s ig n i f ic a n t  than the average 
fore ign  comparable ra te .  This f in d in g  is probably the re s u l t  o f  using 
averages. The average fore ign  ra te  is  lower than the highest fo re ign  
ra te  and is  th e re fo re  not t r u ly  the opportunity  cost ra te .  Furthermore, 
the averaging o f  forward rates reduces the impact o f  large  discounts and 
premiums which have existed fo r  in d iv id u a l countr ies . A d d i t io n a l ly ,  the 
U.S. ra te  may be more col l in e a r  w ith  the highest fo re ign  ra te  than the 
average fore ign  ra te .
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The s ig n if ic a n ce  o f o ther var iab les  is  s im i la r  to the previous re s u l t  
although i t  sould be pointed out th a t  in th is  equation , the sign o f  the
c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r  the Voluntary C red it  R e s tra in t  program and the imposition
o f reserve requirements is  as pred icted .
The E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  when seen as p a rt  o f  the U.S. market in I I I  below 
presents some su rp ris in g  f in d in g s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  when compared w ith  the  
E u ro -d o lla r  as p a r t  o f the fo re ign  market in IV . Ordinary Least
squares y ie lded  the fo llow ing  re su lts :
Red = 1.4111 + 1.0613 Rf -  .0024 USGnp + .0740 USMS
standard e r ro r  .8178 .0856 .0016 .8426
( t -v a lu e )  (1 .7 2 9 8 ) (1 2 .4 0 2 7 )  ( -1 .5 3 2 7 )  (1 .7383)
+ .0014 V -  .1254 USRR + .2888 USD -  .0698 USRQ -  .1222 Qg
.0028 .2675 .3949 .3832 .1481 ( I I I - A )
(.5087 ) ( - .4 6 8 8 )  ( .7314 ) ( - .1 8 2 3 )  ( - .8 2 5 1 )
-  .0736 q + .2172 Q4  
.1548 .1498
(- .4 7 5 6 )  (1 .4502)
n = 76 R“ = .9499 DW = 2.4039 SE = .4593
Again, there  is  au to co rre la t io n  in both equations generalized le a s t  
squares were used to  obtain the fo llow ing:
Red = 1.3524 + 1.0851 Rf -  .0025 USGnp + .0788 USMS
standard e r ro r  .6797 .0780 .0013 .0387
( t -v a lu e )  (1 .9 8 9 7 )(1 3 .9 0 3 4 )  ( -1 .8 5 6 1 )  (2 .0375)
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+ .0013 V -  .1947 USRR + .3364 USD -  .1086 USRQ -  .1031 Q
.0024 .2282 .3566 .3427 .1309
(.566 4 ) ( - .8 5 3 2 )  ( .9435 ) ( - .3 1 6 8 )  ( - .7 8 7 2 )  ( I I I - B )
-  .0467 Q + .2547 
.1341 .1329
( - .3 4 8 6 )  (1 .9169)
n = 75 r2 = .9661 DW = 2.1722 SE = .4501
The above f ind ings  can be compared w ith  the re s u lts  of the E u ro -d o lla r  
market when viewed as part o f  the fo re ign  market. Ordinary Least squares
procedures y ie ld e d  the fo llow ing  re su lts :
Red = -4 .6326  + .7649 Rus -  .1189 FP + .0569 FGNP
standard e r ro r  3.6799 .1370 .0575 .0409
( t -v a lu e )  ( - 1 .2 5 8 9 ) (5 .5 8 5 4 )  (2 .1330) (1 .4346)
-  .0012 FMS + .3024 SW + .6921 SS + .1023 Q,
2 ( IV -A )
.0040 .2819 .5054 .2585
( - .2 9 1 0 )  (1 .0727) (1 .3693) ( .3955 )
+ .0341 Q3 + .5114 
.2512 .2504
( .1 35 9 )  (2 .0427)
n = 76 R  ^ = .8636 DW = 1.8787 SE = .7534
•59-
Using generalized le a s t  squares, the E u ro -d o lla r  r a te  as part o f  the 
fo re ig n  market y ie ld s  the fo llow ing:
Red = -4 .1893  + .7361 Rus -  .1240 FP + .0550 FGNP
standard e r ro r  3.7615 .1377 .0578 .0417
( t -v a lu e )  ( -1 .1 1 3 7 )(5 .3 4 3 5 )  ( -2 .2 6 3 8 )  (1 .31 8 5 ) ( IV -B )
- .0 0 0 6  FMS + .2850 SW .6260 SS + .0919 Qp
.0041 .2794 .5027 .2594
( - .1 4 2 9 )  (1 .0202) (1 .2452) (.3543)
.0391 q + .4940 
.2547 .2531
(.1 5 3 4 )  (1 .9523)
n = 75 = .8541 DW = 1.9827 SER = .7396
F i r s t ,  i t  should be noted th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  f i t  w ith  the U.S. 
market is  b e t te r  than the fore ign  market. The f i t  may be due to higher c o r re la ­
t io n  between the E uro -do llar  ra te  and the highest comparable ra te  than 
between the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  and the U.S. ra te .  The U.S. ra te  is  not 
included in the regression. Also, the r e la t i v e  f i t s  may be the re s u l t  
o f the exclusion of U.S. r e s t r ic t io n s  in the fo re ig n  market. These 
r e s t r ic t io n s  may a f fe c t  the fo re ign  market as much as they a f fe c t  the  
E u ro -d o lla r  market. (Note regressions I . )  Supportive o f th is  l in e  
o f reasoning are the in te re s t  ra te  t -va lu es  in the four equations immediately  
above. The highest e f fe c t iv e  in te re s t  ra te  is the primary va r ia b le  in 
s ig n if ic a n ce  in  the U.S. market equations, and i t s  regression c o e f f ic ie n t
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is  approximately one (1 .0 )  consistent w ith the thes is  th a t  the Euro­
d o l la r  ra te  equals the opportunity  cost ra te .  In comparison, the U.S. 
ra te  w hile  s ig n if ic a n t  in the fore ign  market is  much less so, and i t s  
regression c o e f f ic ie n t  is  much less than one.
In the U.S. market equation, U.S. money supply and GNP are both 
s ig n if ic a n t  v ar iab les . In the case of money supply, the f ind ing  of higher 
in te r e s t  rates with g re a te r  money supply may be symtomatic o f one o f two 
phenomena: the Gibson (or F isher) e f fe c t  or expansion o f the money supply
v ia  Euro -do llar  borrowings. The Gibson e f f e c t  is  the h is to r ic a l  coincidence 
o f high in te re s t  ra tes  w ith  r is in g  prices . I f  we accept the theory th a t  
r is in g  prices cannot be sustained without increasing money supply, then 
we can assert th a t  c o rre la t io n  of higher in te r e s t  ra tes  with increasing  
money supply is not a surpris ing  find ing  in data covering p r im a r i ly  
the la te  1960's. A l te r n a t iv e ly ,  E uro -do llar  borrowings can cause an 
increase in loanable funds concurrent w ith higher in te r e s t  rates as 
explained in Chapter I .  Thus, i f  U.S. banks are f u l l y  loaned up. Euro­
d o l la r  borrowings can cause an increase in money supply.
The sign o f  the GNP v a r ia b le  is  opposite th a t  which was predicted.
The coincidence o f negative U.S. GNP and higher E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  can be 
explained as the r e s u l t  o f recognition lags in monetary p o licy  (which 
was p r im ar i ly  an in te re s t  ra te  po licy  during the period studied) or 
the concern fo r  in te rn a t io n a l  cap ita l flows during the period.
While the other var iab les  in the U.S. market model are in s ig n i f ic a n t ,  
i t  should be noted th a t  t h e i r  signs (except fo r  the r e d e f in i t io n  of
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demand d e p o s i t s )  a r e  as p r e d i c t e d .  I n c r e a s e d  r e s t r i c t i v e n e s s  
o f  t he  V o l u n t a r y  C r e d i t  Exchange Pr ogr am i s  p o s i t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  E u r o - d o l l a r  r a t e s  wher e as  bot h  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of  r e s e r v e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and t h e  r emova l  o f  c e r t a i n  U . S .  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
c e i l i n g s  ( R e g u l a t i o n  Q) d e c r e a s e  U . S .  demand a nd ,  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l o w e r  E u r o - d o l l a r  r a t e s .  The r e d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  demand d e p o s i t s  f o r  r e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t  c a l c u l a t i o n ,  as 
p r e v i o u s l y  m e n t i o n e d  p r o b a b l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  i n t e r e s t  i n e l a s t i c  
p o r t i o n  o f  U . S .  demand f o r  E u r o - d o l l a r s .
I n  t h e  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t ,  t h e  d i s c o u n t  on f o r w a r d  exc ha nge  i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l .  The s i g n  o f  t h e  f o r w a r d  premi um 
i s  n e g a t i v e  as t h e  f o r w a r d  p e r c e n t a g e  r a t e  was s u b t r a c t e d  f r om  
t h e  f o r e i g n  r a t e  when c a l c u l a t i n g  t he  h i g h e s t  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  
r a t e .  As p r e v i o u s l y  m e n t i o n e d ,  f o r e i g n  GNP and f o r e i g n  money  
s u p p l y  have t h e  p r e d i c t e d  s i g n s  a l t h o u g h  t h e  l a t t e r  v a r i a b l e ,  
money s u p p l y ,  has v i r t u a l l y  no s i g n i f i c a n c e .  The s p e c u l a t i v e  
v a r i a b l e s  a r e  m a r g i n a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  and b o t h  have p o s i t i v e  s i g n s  
The p o s i t i v e  s i g n s  o f  bot h  may r e f l e c t  t h e  s i m u l t a n e i t y  o f  
s p e c u l a t i o n  on weak and s t r o n g  c u r r e n c i e s .
O r d i n a r y  and g e n e r a l i z e d  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  r e g r e s s i o n s  on t h e  
r a t i o  o f  t h e  E u r o - d o l l a r  -  U . S .  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  to t he  f o r e i g n  
U. S .  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to as t he  c o mp o s i t e  
y i e l d e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s :
O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  Squa r e s
^ f^ '-~ Ru~F  = .31  98 -  . 5 2 3 7  ( D- 1  ) -  1 . 8 7 0 0  USMS 
1 2 1 . 3 6 1 2  . 1 0 8 4  . 8 0 7 0
( . 2 6 3 2 )  ( . 4 8 2 9 )  ( 2 . 3 1 7 1 )
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-  . 3 0 2 7  FGNP 
1 . 5 0 1 8  
( . 2 0 1 6 )
+ 1378  ( D - 0 1 )  SS 
. 4 9 8 3  ( D - 0 1 )
( . 2 7 6 4 )
+ . 1 1 3 9  USGNP 
. 1 6 7 4  
( . 6 8 0 4 )
- 5 5 . 8 2 9 7  FDR 
8 . 6 6 3 3  
( 6 . 4 4 4 3 )
+ 1 9 . 4 2 3 1  V -  2 3 . 0 9 5 5  USRR + 5 5 . 2 1 9 0  USD 
5 . 8 1 3 3  8 . 0 5 0 5  1 0 . 4 3 2 6
( 3 . 3 4 1 1 )  ( 2 . 8 6 8 8 )
-  3 5 . 4 5 0 5  USRQ -  . 1 7 2 6  BP
9 . 4 9 1 4  2 . 8 8 9 5
( 3 . 7 3 5 0 )  ( . 5 9 7 5 )
-  2 . 7 2 7 5  ( D - 3 0 )  Q^
2 . 6 8 5 9
( 1 . 0 1 5 5 )
( 5 . 2 9 2 9 )  
1 . 3 2 3 6  Q 
2 . 8 1 4 9  
( . 4 7 0 2 )  
3585  ( D - 2 7 )  
. 2 0 4 2  ( D - 0 2 )
( 1 . 7 5 5 5 )
+ 5780  SW
3 . 3 4 9 1
( . 1 7 2 6 )
-  1 . 8 6 2 2  FSR 
8 . 7 8 2 0  
( . 2 1 2 0 )
( V - A )
n = 76 r 2  = . 6 8 8 8  DW = 2 . 1 2 3 5 SER = 8 . 1 1 5 2
g e n e r a l i z e d  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  wer e  a l s o  r un a l t h o u g h  u n n e c e s s a r y  
f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  o c c u r r e d :
= -  2 9 . 6 6 2 1  -  4 . 1  73 ( D - 0 1 )  FMS -  1 . 8 0 4 4  USMS R f -  Rus ' '
The
1 2 1 . 6 6 0 8  
. 2438
. 1 0 8 3
. 4 5 4 0
. 7 9 2 8  
( 2 . 2 7 6 1 )
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-  . 1942  FGNP + . 9 3 0 7  ( D - 0 1 )  USGNP + . 5 5 9 5  SW
1 . 4 9 5 5  163 5  3 . 3 7 6 7
( . 1 2 9 9 )  ( . 5 6 9 4 )  ( . 1 6 5 9 )
+ . 1 3 5 2  SS -  5 5 . 4 0 3 2  FDR - 1 . 6 6 1 2  FSR ( V - B )
4 8 1 2  ( D - 0 1 )  8 . 6 6 6 2  8 . 8 9 7 0
( . 2 8 9 0 )  - 6 . 3 9 2 9  - . 1 8 6 7
+ 1 9 . 8 7 0 9  V -  2 3 . 0 9 1 1  USRR + 5 5 . 9 4 1 8  USD 
5 . 8 6 0 6  8 . 0 5 5 7  1 0 . 3 6 0 5
( 3 . 3 9 0 6 )  ( 2 . 8 6 6 4 )  ( 5 . 3 9 9 5 )
-  3 6 . 3 8 1 7  USRQ -  . 2 1 9 5  BP -  1 . 3 0 7 9  Qg
9 . 4 0 3 7  2 . 8 4 1 8  2 . 7 4 2 9
( 3 . 8 6 8 9 )  ( . 7 7 2 3  D-01 ) ( . 4 7 6 8 )
-  2 . 8 4 8 5  Q3  -  . 3 3 1 2  ( D - 0 2 )
2 . 6 2 1 1  2 . 0 0 1  ( D - 0 2 )
( 1 . 0 8 6 7 )  ( 1 . 6 5 5 1 )
n = 75 r 2 = . 6 9 2 3  DW = 2 . 0 6 3  SER = 8 . 1 6 1 5
The R ^ ' s f o r  t h e  two c o mp o s i t e  r e g r e s s i o n s  ar e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l o we r  
t h a n  t h e  R ^ ' s  on t h e  r e g r e s s i o n s  r un on i n t e r e s t  r a t e  l e v e l s .  These  
l o w e r  R ^ ' s  a r e  e x p e c t e d ;  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  v a r i a t i o n  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  more a p t  t o  be a f f e c t e d  by u n s p e c i f i e d  and 
u n q u a n t i f i a b l e  v a r i a b l e s  t h a n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  E u r o - d o l l a r  r a t e s .
p
N o t h w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e  R s a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  h i gh  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  
E u r o - d o l l a r  r a t e  has g r a v i t a t e d  t o w a r d  a l i g n m e n t  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  
c o m p a r a b l e  r a t e  and away f r om t h e  U . S .  r a t e .
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Of the var iab les  regressed against the composite r a t i o ,  r e s t r ic t io n s  
on cap ita l  flows are the most s ig n i f ic a n t  category probably in d ica t in g  
th a t  the E uro -do llar  market has acted as a loophole fo r  c a p ita l  flows  
when other markets have been unable to accomodate them. I f  the o r ig in  of  
the Euro-dollar market can be a t t r ib u te d  to the reduction o f  exchange 
controls in the United Kingdom ( in  1957) and other major countries  ( in  1958),  
the imposition o f  other contro ls  can be said to be responsible fo r  the  
market's s ig n if ic a n t  and r e la t i v e l y  independent growth. T h e o re t ic a l ly ,  
the necessary conditions fo r  the c rea tio n  o f any banking system based 
on fore ign currency deposits are: 1 ) the existence o f in te r e s t  ra te
d i f fe r e n t ia ls  between national c r e d i t  markets, 2 ) a s u f f i c i e n t  degree o f  
freedom from exchange contro ls  to permit investors to take advantage 
of ra te  d if fe re n ce s , and 3) s u f f ic ie n t  confidence in the ve h ic le  currency 
to permit the p o te n t ia l  fo r  p r o f i t  to outweigh the r is k .  To the above 
requirements one ad d it io n a l q u a l i f ic a t io n  must be appended. T h e o re t ic a l ly ,  
short term money c a p ita l  w i l l  f low  to the country having the highest 
short-term deposit ra te  given the r is k  of d e fa u lt  and i l l i q u i d i t y .
I f  one accepts the three requirements l is t e d  above, no reason e x is ts  
fo r  the development o f a separate fore ign  currency banking market unless 
there is some d is in c e n tive  to depositing or borrowing d i r e c t l y  in  the  
country y ie ld in g  the highest or lowest comparable r a te .  R e s tr ic t io n s  
a ffe c t in g  d i r e c t  investment can be postulated as the in c en tive  fo r  increased  
use of the E u ro -d o lla r  market and fo r  the movrment toward r e la t iv e  
independence o f E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .
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As can be seen above a l l  U.S.  re s t r ic t io n s  except the Voluntary  
C red it  R es tra in t Program v a r ia b le  are s ig n i f ic a n t .  The imposition  
o f reserve requirements on E u ro -d o lla r  borrowings by U.S. banks in  
October, 1969, increased the e f fe c t iv e  cost o f  U.S. bank borrowing o f  
E uro -do lla rs . While regressions I I I A  and I I I B  show the e f fe c t  o f  the 
requirement was to  decrease U.S.  demand fo r  E u ro -d o lla rs ,  and there fore  
E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s ,  the p o s it ive  sign in the in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia l  
composite reveals th a t  the reserve requirements tended to widen the 
r e la t iv e  E u ro -d o lla r  -  U.S.  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  The apparent c o n f l i c t  in  
signs can be resolved i f  increased independence o f  Euro-do llar  ra tes  is  
accepted as the r e s u l t  o f  the imposition o f  reserves. Thus, as a re s u lt  
of the imposition o f  reserve requirements, E u ro -d o lla r  rates increased th e i r  
s e n s i t iv i t y  to the highest comparable r a te .  The monopsonistic control o f  
E uro -do llar  by U.S. bank ra tes  was no longer a determinant fa c to r  in the  
E uro -do lla r  ra te .  This increased s e n s i t i v i t y  can be substantiated by 
E u ro -d o lla r  a c t i v i t y  in 1970 when, despite  large  repayments o f funds 
to the market by U.S.  banks, the E u ro -d o lla r  market continued to expand.
The market, in 1970, not only found other o u t le ts  fo r  the money returned  
to i t  by U.S. banks, but also experienced an increase in to ta l  lending.
The removal o f  the Regulation Q c e i l in g  on ninety  day U.S. bank 
c e r t i f ic a te s  o f deposit in June, 1970, increased the r e la t iv e  Euro­
d o l la r  -  U.S.  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  The p o s it iv e  sign fo r  the removal of  
c e i l in g  rates may r e f l e c t  decreased supply o f  d i re c t  U.S. d o l la rs  to the 
E uro -do llar  market although, t h e o r e t ic a l ly ,  th is  type of c ap ita l  outflow  
had been re s t r ic te d  by the Voluntary C re d it  R es tra in t Act o f  1965.
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I t  can be hypothesized th a t  e i th e r  the Voluntary C re d it  R e s tra in t  
Program was in e f fe c t iv e  or th a t  an a l te r n a t iv e  combination o f events is  
responsible fo r  the increased E uro -do lla r  -  U.S.  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  The 
a lte rn a t iv e  occurence which could be responsible fo r  the increased  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  is  the r e la t iv e  expansion o f E u ro -d o lla r  loans in 1970 
fo r  extensive c re d i t  in the United Kingdom and fo r  speculation on 
the mark. I f ,  in 1970 -  a year o f  genera lly  d ec lin ing  in te r e s t  ra tes  -  
E uro -do lla r  ra tes  declined r e la t i v e ly  less than U.S.  and fo re ign  rates  
as the r e s u l t  o f  p ro p o rt io n a te ly  g reater r e la t iv e  demand, then the 
ine ffec tiveness  o f the Voluntary C red it  R e s tra in t  Program need not be 
held responsible fo r  th is  f in d in g .
The negative v a r ia b le  fo r  the re d e f in i t io n  o f  demand deposits  
(which increased required reserves) r e f le c ts  a higher U.S.  r a te ,  
thereby decreasing the composite r a t io .  This explanation is  compatible 
with the discussion of regressions lA and IB whereby U.S. banks appear 
to borrow Euro-dollars  ir re s p e c t iv e  o f the ra te  in order to meet 
reserve requirements. Such borrowings could take place simul­
taneously w ith  r is in g  domestic ra tes  as a r e s u l t  o f the squeeze on reserves.
In add ition  to  U.S.  r e s t r ic t io n s ,  fo re ign  supply r e s t r ic t io n s  are 
s ig n if ic a n t  in regressions VA and VB. The s p e c if ic  r e s t r ic t io n  (see 
page 29) was the imposition o f a t h i r t y  percent reserve requirement on 
increases in c ap ita l  inflows in to  Germany in A p r i l ,  1970. The negative  
sign r e f le c ts  a decrease in the composite probably as a re s u l t  concurrent 
with  higher fo re ign  ra tes  re s u lt in g  from decreased supply in to  the  
fore ign  market and decreased E uro -do lla r  borrowings and, consequently.
-67 -
E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .  Foreign market demand re s t r ic t io n s  although in s ig n i f ic a n t  
a t  the 40% leve l have a p o s it iv e  sign which coincides w ith  decreased 
fo re ign  rates and increased E uro-ra tes .
One of the most s ig n i f ic a n t  var iab les  in the composites is  speculation  
on strong currencies . The sign o f the c o e f f ic ie n t  is  p o s it iv e  r e f le c t in g  
increased demand fo r  Euro -do lla rs  and higher E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .  The 
s ig n if ic a n ce  o f  th is  v a r ia b le  suggests th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  market acts  
to  in te n s ify  speculative  c a p ita l  flows despite  the lack o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  
o f  the v a r ia b le  representing speculation on weak currencies . The 
absence of a c le a r -c u t  f in d in g  fo r  speculation on weak currencies may 
be the re s u l t  o f  the frequent coincidence o f speculation on weak 
and strong currencies plus the motive o f minimizing losses (as opposed 
to motive o f  obtaining p r o f i ts  from the d o l la r  view p o in t)  in  the case 
o f devaluation speculation . During a deva luation , losses can be minimized  
by moving cash balances out o f  weak currencies whereas p r o f i t s  are made 
by borrowing weak currencies and converting in to  stronger ones.
Corporations and in d iv id u a ls  can borrow more e a s i ly  during re va lu a t io n  
crises  than during devaluation . The r e s t r ic t io n  and moral suasion 
applied against borrowing weak currencies during a devaluation c r is is  
may tend to l i m i t  some p r o f i t  motivated speculation using borrowed 
balances. There are no s im i la r  r e s t r ic t io n s  on borrowing to speculate  
on strong currencies.
The other var iab les  in V worthy o f mention are the U.S.  money supply, 
the fourth  quarter seasonal adjustment, and the balance o f payments.
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The U.S. money supply v a r ia b le  is  p o s it iv e ly  re la te d  to the composite and 
is  s l ig h t ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .  This f ind ing  may r e f l e c t  an increase in money 
supply in the U.S.  as a r e s u l t  o f E uro -do llar  borrowings. The p o s it ive  
sign o f  the fourth  qu arte r  is  also s l ig h t ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  and appears to  
r e f l e c t  year-end borrowing by fore ign  banks. The balance o f  payments 
v a r ia b le ,  while  o f  questionable s ig n if icance  is  worth noting since the 
sign r e f le c ts  an increase in the r e la t iv e  E u ro -d o lla r  -  U.S.  d i f f e r e n t ia l  
coincid ing  w ith  a pred icted  decrease in the balance o f  payments d e f i c i t  
(the proxy fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  money supply).
The in the composite regression is  high enough as previously  
mentioned to support the p o s s ib i l i t y  of a s h i f t  in the s tru c tu re  o f  the 
E u ro -d o lla r  market. A s h i f t  means th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  -  U.S. alignment 
had changes r e la t iv e  to the fore ign -  U.S.  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  To confirm the 
existence o f th is  s h i f t ,  a Chow te s t  was performed on the generalized  
le a s t  square composite regression o f set V above. The data were divided  
a t the month o f the imposition o f reserve requirements on E u ro -d o lla r  
borrowings (October 1969). The Chow te s t  was ca lcu la ted  from Regression 
VB plus the fo llow ing  sub-periods:
- 6 9 -
BEFORE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
Red -  Rus = -  . 8 0 1 . 9 1 6 5  t  . 1 8 3 3  FMS -  2 . 6 3 4 6  USMS 
R f -  Rus
3 3 4 . 5 8 4 7  . 1 9 9 6  1 . 1 6 0 1
( 2 . 3 9 6 8 )  ( . 9 1 8 2 )  ( 2 . 2 7 1 0 )
3 . 0 5 1 5  FGNP + . 1 1 2 2  USGNP + 1 . 4 8 0 5  SW
1 . 9 6 0  . 2 7 4 0  3 . 9 1 6 3
( 1 . 5 5 6 6 )  ( . 4 0 9 3 )  ( . 3 7 8 0 )
- 6 3 . 4 3 9 7  SS -  . 3581  FDR + 1 8 . 1 7 6 5  FSR 
1 0 . 7 2 6 5  9 . 1 4 9 9  6 . 3 2 0 2
5 . 9 1 4 3  C -  3 9 1 3 )  2 . 8 7 5 9
-  5 . 1 7 0 4  V -  3 8 . 6 0 7 5  USRR -  6 3 . 5 7 6 4  USD
2 . 1 4 5 0  1 2 . 0 7 7 8  1 1 . 6 5 2 6
( 2 . 4 1 0 4 )  ( . 3 1 9 6 6 )  ( 5 . 4 5 6 0 )
-  3 0 . 2 2 6 8  USRQ - . 3 7 1 3  ( D - 0 2 )  -  1 . 9 9 4 0  Q
1 1 . 0 8 4 5  3 . 8 5 5 7  38219
( 2 . 7 2 6 9 )  ( . 9 6 0 5  D - 0 3  ) ( . 521 7)
-  1 . 9 9 4 0  Q3 -  . 3 5 4 0  Q^
3822 3 . 5 2 4 8
( . 5 2 1 7 )  ( . 1 0 0 4 )
n = 51 R^ = . 7 9 3 0  DW = 2 . 0 6 4 3  SE = 8 . 1 4 4 3
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AFTER RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
Red Rjis   ^ - 3 6 6 . 4 6 8 9  -  . 271 2 FMS -  2 . 3 9 9 3  USMS 
R f -  Rus
2 4 3 . 1 8 6 5  . 2 1 1 0  1 . 6 7 9 3
( 1 . 5 0 6 9 )  ( 1 . 2 8 5 6 )  ( 1 . 4 2 8 8 )
+ 5 . 5 9 7 9  FGNP -  . 2 9 4 2  USGNP - 5 . 5 7 2 7  SW
3 . 7 9 2 2  ( D - 1 3)  . 4 5 8 2  ( 0 - 1 2 )  1 1 . 0 9 0 2  ( 0 - 1 2 )
1 . 4 7 6 2  ( 0 - 6 )  . 6 4 2 2  ( 0 - 6 )  . 5 0 2 5  ( 0 - 5 )
. 6 5 7 4  ( . 1 0 9 4 )  + 5 . 2 6 9 6  - 1 . 3 8 6 4
5 . 4 4 6 9  6 . 5 7 0 4  ( 9 . 6 7 5 )  ( . 2 1 1 0 )
-  6 . 0 9 6 0  5 . 8 0 1 9  ( 1 . 0 5 0 7 )
n = 25 R' 4703 OW = 2 . 4 2 5 4 SE = 7 . 3 5 8 5
Chow T e s t F = 2 . 0 6 n = 75 k = 16
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Since the c r i t i c a l  value o f  F (75) is  1 . 74,  the hypothesis th a t  there  
is  no s h i f t  in the s tru c tu re  o f the r e la t iv e  E uro -do lla r  -  U.S. d i f f e r e n t ia l  
can be re jec ted . This f in d in g  confirms th a t  the s truc tu re  of the Euro­
d o l la r  market has changed over time and th a t  r e la t iv e  separation of the
Euro -do llar  market from the U.S.  market must be considered as a d is t in c t  
p o s s ib i l i ty .
This s h i f t  in s tru c tu re  is  also found in the Branson study and 
is  repeated using more recent data . Bransoré study o f  the s e n s i t iv i t y
o f  in te re s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  to  changes in the U.S. ra te  "suggested
th a t  changes in the U.S.  ra te  w i l l  exp la in  changes in the U.S.  -  Euro­
d o l la r  d i f f e r e n t ia l  b e tte r  than any o f  the U.S.  fore ign  national d i f f e r ­
e n t ia ls . "  His resu lts  were as fo llow s:
D i f f e r e n t ia l
A(US-Can)
( t -v a lu e )
a(US-UK)
( t -v a lu e )
A(US-Ger)
( t -v a lu e )
A(US-E)
( t -v a lu e )
C o e f f ic ie n t  o f  regression on aUS
.83941
(.16238)
1.0426
(.1599 )
1.2617
( . 4342)
.8274
(.0925 )
n = 85 (February, 1956 -  February, 1966) 
Where
US = U.S.  ra te
Can = Canadian ra te
UK = United Kingdom ra te
.24134
.33549
.09129
.50602
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Ger = German ra te  
ED = E u ro -d o lla r  ra te
Using s im i la r  data (except om itting Sw itzerland and adding Neitherlands)  
fo r  a more recent sample period, the re su lts  were s u b s ta n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  
as can be seen in Table I (page 74) .  U n like  the Branson data , the regressions  
of changes o f U.S.  -  fore ign  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  w ith  the exception of Canada 
are higher fo r  U.S. -  fore ign d i f f e r e n t i a ls  than fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  
r a te ,  expla in  most o f  the variance in changes in  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  i . e . ,  
the R^'s are g re a te r  than .5 . This t e s t  is  repeated using day to day 
in te r e s t  ra tes  shown in Table I I  (page 75) .
F in a l ly ,  a scaled down version o f  the Hendershott study has been 
attempted to discern i f  there is any d if fe re n c e  in the tim ing o f reactions  
of fore ign  ra tes  to U.S.  rates versus E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .  The re s u lts  are 
shown in Tables I I I  and IV (pages 76 & 77 ) .  The data are fo r  three month 
in te r e s t  ra tes  in Table I I I  and day to day ra tes  in Table IV .
As can be seen. Tables I I I  and IV show the re su lts  o f  regressing  
changes in various fore ign  in te re s t  ra tes  w ith  a one, two and three  
period lag on changes in U.S. and E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s .  The R^'s fo r  
time lagged responses to changes in both U.S.  and E u ro -d o lla r  rates are  
s im i la r ,  thereby r e f le c t in g  the close c o r re la t io n  o f  a l l  in te re s t  ra te s .  
However, i t  should be noted th a t  w ith  the exception o f the Canadian 
three  month in te r e s t  ra te  data , there  is  no apparent one to one r e la t io n ­
ship between e i t h e r  the U.S.  or E u ro -d o lla r  market. Consequently, 
the find ings do not support Branson's so -ca lled  re s e rv o ir  hypothesis -  
th a t  the U.S.  in te r e s t  ra te  sets the general leve l o f  world in te r e s t  
ra te s .  This f in d in g  lends credence to the importance o f  a concept o f
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comparable opportunity  costs in the determination o f  in te r e s t  ra te s .
The m u l t i - c o l l in e a r i t y  of a l l  in te r e s t  rates can be b e t te r  explained  
in  terms o f opportunity  costs than a U.S. rese rvo ir  hypothesis.
F in a l l y ,  i t  should be noted th a t  w h ile  the regression c o e f f ic ie n ts  are  
g e n e ra l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  fo r  changes in  U.S. and E u ro -d o lla r  ra tes  in the 
f i r s t  period , the p ic tu re  is  very mixed as to the tim ing o f  s ig n i f ic a n t  
secondary impacts o f U.S. and E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  changes. This mixed 
tim ing p ic tu re  may r e f l e c t  the forward exchange m arket's  ro le  in  adjusting  
comparable in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .
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TABLE I
In te re s t  Rate D i f f e r e n t ia l  Changes Using 3 Month In te re s t  Rates
( - V
Constant C o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
Regression on
A us
SE F
-  Can ) 
value)
• T
0 . . . L  .
 ^T7 iri 0 , ovn
-  UK)
- I ' : ;  '
n"-  ^r r
-  Ger)
( '1 r - , ' 1
, f " '.|9
-  Neth) 70.171"
-  US) ,  ^' 0 ''j ' 71.17A9
Constant C o e ff ic ie n t  o f  
Regression on 
A ED
R?. F
-  Can) 
value)
, m ni" 0 1  r\ r, 1 ni ^ r\n... ' #  -
 ^n ' ) o • <-■ - . 9 - 1 1  ' i ' l . ^ O l . n n o p ,
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US = U.S. treasury b i l l  ra te
Can = Canadian treasury  b i l l  ra te
UK = United Kingdom treasury  b i l l  ra te
Ger = German treasury  b i l l  ra te
Neth = Netherlands treasury  b i l l  ra te
ED = E uro -do lla r  ra te
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TABLE I I
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL CHANGES USING DAY INTEREST RATES
C o e ff ic ie n t  of  
Regression on
Constant A US F
A (US -  Can) 
( t  values)
.03070 -.67751
(-4 .0 65 8 0 )
.4559 .35395 16.5307
A (US -  UK) 
( t  values)
.01710 -.81123
(-5 .70923 )
.5839 .30181 32.953
A (US -  Germ) 
( t  values)
.00848 -.92610
(2.68821)
.3208 .73175 7.2265
A (US -  Nether) 
( t  values)
.09561 -.81962
(.35926)
.3593 .56975 9.3366
Constant
C o e f f ic ie n t  of 
Regression on 
A ED F
A (ED -  Can) 
( t  values)
.04438 -.83362
(-7 .85284 )
.7033 .35741 61.6671
A (ED -  UK) 
( t  values)
.02871 -.95358
(-10 .51367)
.7481 .30538 110.5372
A (ED -  Ger) 
( t  values)
.02852 -1.20081
(-5 .56093 )
.5738 .72704 30.9240
A (ED -  Nether) 
( t  values)
.41238 -1.03585
(6.10157
.6095 .57159 37.2292
US = federa l fund ra te
Can = Canadian day to day rate
UK = United Kingdom c a l l  ra te
Ger = German day to day ra te
Nether = Netherlands day to day rate
ED = E u ro -d o lla r  ra te
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TABLE I I I
A US -  Can 
March-Dec.
Jan .-J u ly  
6 8  -  69
64
65
6 6  
67
INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL 
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C o e ff ic ie n t  r2
- . [ 9 0 8 1  .ù inn  
- ]  . l -V H n  .7 7 1 “
. I T -7 "
-1 ,11 - " I  ,
CHANGES OVER 
US -  UK
TIME
US
C o e ff ic ie n t
-.1 6 6 1 1  
.01 ''97  
.0^200  
.009^?
1 . 251;^
r 2
. 00^7
. 0 1 2 [
.6677
.099  r
. 09.02
A US -  Ger US -  N
March-Dec. 64 - 1 . . -1 7 0 -0 .2 0 1 1 7 .7' '?7
65 .'-'l/.T l . l " o ] 7 .07O/'
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_ v _ I . 7 / / 9 .<070
67 .  1 'O'O .o r  99^
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6 8  -  69 7 . - IT  2^ .990':,
A Can A^ED 9 'ED-1 UK A* ED 9
C o e ff ic ie n t R^ C o e f f ic ie n t R%
March-Dec. 64 f- n ' - '  ■- , r99 _;i .  90993 .61^7
65 1 .0':':,: r .7017 - .0 7 0 1 : . [ 1 ^ 0
6 6 - .7 8 ^ 7 9 .1-109 -.'0?o6'!. . / loa i
67 . . I ' m , 9; CO-9 A ."6 9 0
Jan .-J u ly
6 8  -  69 -1 ,11''97 .0900 .Qc.nUl _099L
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March-Dec. 64 . 9 0 9 9 2 . 2]2 6 7 .  02.71
65 .]0O9 2.<nOL7 .  07 C O
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67 .  SO''l') ,l] /!.9 - I .07010 . 7256.
J an .-J u ly
6 8  -  69 -1.0190% .190? - I . I I 256 .8808
ED -  US
March-Dec. 64 . I T ' V l  1 .1 7 0 /
65 .1 17 ''- .071 ' I
6 6 .'■'10/
67 . 200] / .1 /7 ' '
Jan .-J u ly
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TABLE IV
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF INTEREST RATES TO CHANGES IN THE U.S. AND
EURO-DOLLAR RATE
3 Month Rates
r  Canada
Constant
t
t - 1
t - 2
U S
re g r .  coef.
I .1^7"
( t  value)
(
E D
regr. coef. ( t  value)
R^
r  United Kingdon
Constant
t
t - 1
t - 2
.7^a] 
.77?n 
.0711 
. I ' l l  'I
(6 .7651)
(] .?17A )
( .loniO
R" = 117 0 1 1 ;
r  Germany
Constant
t
t - 1
t - 2
R^
, 72 7''. 
- . 1  071
.0707
.1 :7
fv . lq lO )
(_ ,^ lO l )
r_ ,n l7 7 )
(2 .1771)
1 .7h.ni 
- .0 1 1 9  
.nkqO. 
.2171
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( 0.74<'|.) 
( - . 2 =2 1) 
r . j T ' i i )  
f l . c i l O l
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t
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r 2
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-.10^2
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(2.1041)
CHAPTER VI 
Comparative Findings
The f ind ings  o f th is  paper d i f f e r  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  w ith  the f ind ings  o f  
other studies o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market. The hypothesis o f the E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te 's  p a r i ty  w ith  the highest comparable in te re s t  r a te ,  substantiated  in 
the previous chapter, implies th a t  other studies have erred in t h e i r  
assumptions about the E u ro -d o lla r  market. In the case o f the Hendershott, 
the Kwack, and the Branson s tud ies , there  is  a presumption th a t  the U.S. 
in te r e s t  ra te  estab lishes the leve l o f  world in te re s t  ra tes . In the Hendershott 
and Kwack cases, as discussed in Chapter I I ,  the centra l question is  one 
of the speed o f adjustment of the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  to changes in  the U.S. 
ra te .  Findings o f Chapter V (Table IV ) show th a t  most fo re ign  in te r e s t  
rates tend to ad ju s t to changes in the U.S. ra te  or the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  
in  a manner s im i la r  to Hendershott and Kwack's findings fo r  the E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te  w ith  the most s ig n if ic a n t  adjustments made in the f i r s t  three  periods.  
However, the f ind ings  here show a d d i t io n a l ly  th a t ,  w ith  the exception o f  the 
Canadian in te r e s t  ra te ,  the fo re ign  in te r e s t  r a te 's  adjustment to the U.S. 
ra te  is  v i r t u a l l y  in d is t in g u ish ab le  from the fore ign  ra te 's  adjustment to  
the E u ro -d o lla r  r a te .  Consequently, a presumption o f  U.S. ra te  c au s a lity  
in in te r e s t  ra te  changes is not j u s t i f i a b l e .
The i n a b i l i t y  to d is t in g u ish  the source o f adjustments o f in te r e s t  
ra tes  contrasts  sharply with the re s e rv o ir  hypothesis discussed in  the Branson
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study. According to the re se rv o ir  hypothesis as stated by Branson, the U.S. 
money market estab lishes the leve l o f  in te r e s t  rates in the world whereas 
the fore ign  money markets es tab lish  in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  Thus, 
the world c ap ita l  market is  likened to a main re se rv o ir  w ith  connecting 
pools. A change in the leve l o f  water in one o f the sm aller pools has 
l i t t l e  a f fe c t  on U.S. in te re s t  rates whereas a change in the leve l o f  U.S. 
market rates would a f fe c t  a l l  fo re ign  ra te s . In c o n tra s t ,  the highest 
comparable ra te  hypothesis suggests th a t  the large  re s e rv o ir  should 
represent the highest opportunity  cost ra te  in the world given non-exchange 
r is k ,  not the U.S. ra te .  A ll  in te r e s t  rates should ad just to th is  opportunity  
cost ra te  in the absence of government in te r fe re n c e .  Because the comparable 
E uro -do llar  r a te ,  as seen in each country , acts as the proxy fo r  the highest 
r a te ,  the Euro-rate  w i l l  compete as a sub st itu te  with other market 
s e c u r it ie s  in each country. Consequently, the Euro-ra te  should represent 
the main re se rv o ir  ra te  in d o l la r  terms thereby "determining" the leve l o f  
in te re s t  ra tes . While i t  can be argued th a t  the U.S. market should s t i l l  
be considered the main re s e rv o ir  based upon the magnitude o f  funds in 
the U.S. market, these funds have heretofore  been r e s t r ic te d  from p a r t ic ip a ­
t io n  in fore ign markets. The recent reduction o f these r e s t r ic t io n s  (J a n . ,1974) 
should reduce the in s u la t io n  of U.S. c ap ita l  flows to changes in the highest 
comparable ra te  and should re s u lt  in  increased supplies o f  funds to the 
country or countries with the highest comparable in te r e s t  ra te .  A d ire c t  
consequence o f the reduction of r e s t r ic t io n s  should be increased competition  
between the E u ro -d o lla r  market and the highest comparable in te r e s t  ra te  markets. 
The new U.S. source o f p o ten tia l funds to the E u ro -d o lla r  market has probably 
been a major fa c to r  in reducing in te r e s t  ra te  margins between E uro -do lla r  
loans and deposits during 1974.
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Branson, in his stud ies, has also suggested th a t  fore ign in te r e s t  
rates react fa s te r  to changes in U.S. ra tes  than Euro-dollar ra te s .  In 
Tables I ,  I I ,  and I I I  o f Chapter V, the opposite resu lts  are g e n era lly  found. 
The findings o f th is  paper also show th a t  changes in the U.S. ra te  a f f e c t  the 
U.S. -  fo re ign  in te re s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l  more frequently  than do changes 
in  the fo re ign  ra te .  This r e s u l t  confirms the weakness o f the U.S. 
centra l ra te  re se rv o ir  hypothesis as in te re s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t ia l  changes can 
and frequently  are caused by changes in the U.S. ra te .
The fore ign  in te re s t  ra te  v ar iab les  used in the estimating equations  
o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market have been adjusted to include the forward  
premium or discount on foreign exchange. This adjustment has not been 
used by the other studies of the E u ro -d o lla r  market. Kwack used unadjusted 
in te re s t  rates and found th a t t h e i r  inclus ion  only a ffec ted  the speed o f  
adjustment o f  E uro -do lla r  rates to U.S. ra tes . According to the find ings  
of th is  d is s e r ta t io n ,  Kwack's re s u lts  (showing a slower speed o f  adjustment 
fo r  Euro-rates) r e f l e c t  them isspecif ica tion  o f  the primary independent 
v a r ia b le .  The chain of c au s a lity  implied in the resu lts  of the previous  
Chapter imply th a t  a l l  in te re s t  ra tes  reac t to changes in the highest 
comparable ra te .  Kwack, by using actual fore ign ra te s ,  ignores 
covered in te re s t  a rb itrag e  and presumes a d ire c t  re la t io n s h ip  between U.S. 
and fore ign  ra tes . Consequently, when Kwack in te r je c ts  fore ign  in te r e s t  
ra tes  in  the U.S. -  Euro-do llar  ra te  equations used by Hendershott, the 
re s u lta n t  decreased speed of adjustment may well represent the E u r o -d o l la r 's 
reacting to a p a r t ia l  s p ec if ic a t io n  o f  th e i r  primary determinant.
M is p ec if ic a t io n  of variab les  may also e x is t  in the Black study. Black 
uses a trend term to e lim inate  s e r ia l  c o rre la t io n .  The procedure is  ju s t i f i e d
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as r e f le c t in g  U.S. banks' increasing soph is t ica tion  in the use o f Euro­
dollars gained by experience. A l te r n a t iv e ly ,  the s e r ia l  c o r re la t io n  may 
r e f l e c t  the s h i f t in g  o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market s truc tu re  away from close  
c o rre la t io n  w ith  U.S. ra te s ,  a s h i f t  demonstrated in the preceding chapter  
and, in e f f e c t ,  a trend.
The ro le  of r e s t r ic t io n s  in the development of the E u ro -d o lla r  
market has been considered in the model presented here and in the Black model. 
Black includes the Voluntary C red it  R es tra in t  Act and the In te r e s t  Equaliza­
t io n  Tax which are the only r e s t r ic t io n  re levan t fo r  the time period covered 
by his study. Both r e s t r ic t io n s  are in s ig n i f ic a n t  in the Black study. In 
th is  study the Voluntary C re d it  R es tra in t Act is  also found to be in s ig n i f ic a n t ,  
but, more recent r e s t r ic t io n s  appear to have caused a s h i f t  in  the E u ro -d o lla r  
market away from control by U.S. banks toward increased competition in  the 
world c a p ita l  markets. The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  such a s h i f t  has not been considered 
by other studies although i t  is  suggested by Kindieberger as a trend th a t  may 
occur in  the fu tu re .
Variables representing speculation have not been considered in the  
other stud ies. The s ig n if ic a n ce  of the reva luation  v a r ia b le  used in the 
model above suggests th a t  E u ro -d o lla r  market is  a major source o f f inancing  
fo r  speculative  a c t i v i t y .  Whether currency speculation has a s ta b i l i z in g  
or d e s ta b i l iz in g  e f fe c t  on in te rn a t io n a l trade is  a co n trovers ia l po in t;  cur­
rency speculation has a d e s ta b i l iz in g  e f fe c t  on domestic economic p o licy  in 
the short run. Consequently, the find ing  of s ig n if ic a n t  specu lative  variab les  
tends to  support the reasoning behind those who support in te rve n tio n  in the 
Euro-market by central banks and/or the Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlements.
The f ind ing  th a t  the highest comparable in te re s t  ra te  data series
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explains the Euro-ra te  b e t te r  than the average fore ign  comparable in te r e s t  
ra te  (Chapter V, Regressions I  & I I )  suggests im perfect a rb it rag e  among 
in te re s t  ra tes . O f f ic e r  and W i l l e t t  have noted th a t  deviations from covered 
in te re s t  p a r i ty  may r e s u l t  from the increasing marginal cost o f  borrowing 
and from government in te r fe re n c e  in the amount o f  funds borrowed domes­
t ic a l ly ^ ^ .  E u ro -d o l la rs ,  as an add itional source o f  funds unregulated by 
any a u th o r i ty ,  reduces the marginal cost o f  borrowing fo r  a rb it ra g e  tra n s ­
actions by s h i f t in g  outward the supply o f loanable funds. Consequently, 
growth o f the E u ro -d o lla r  market in the fu tu re  should c o n tin u a lly  reduce the 
variance from p a r i t y .
A d d i t io n a l ly ,  the ease and convenience in depositing and borrowing 
in the E u ro -d o lla r  market and the r e la t iv e  depth and breath o f funds in the 
E uro -do llar  market should a t t r a c t  new a rb it rag e rs  to enter the market e i th e r  
to take advantage o f in te r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between the domestic market 
and the E u ro -d o lla r  market or domestic and other market d if fe re n c e s .  Again, 
the E u ro -d o lla r  market should act to narrow covered d i f f e r e n t ia ls  between 
a l l  c a p ita l  markets.
F in a l ly ,  i t  should be noted t h a t  w hile  the question of a E u ro -d o lla r  
m u l t ip l ie r  has not been tested herein , the in s ig n if ic a n ce  o f the balance of 
payments proxy fo r  E u ro -d o lla r  money supply r e f le c ts  the need fo r  a b e t te r  
measure o f  primary deposits in to  the E u ro -d o lla r  market and does not negate 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a m u l t ip l ie r  process.
4lLawrence M. O f f ic e r  and Thomas D. W i l l e t t ,  "The Covered A rb itrag e  
Schedule; A C r i t i c a l  Survey of Recent Developments", Journal o f  Money Credit  
and Banking, May, 1970, p. 248 and p. 251.
CHAPTER V I I
Conclusion
In summary, the f in d in g s  o f th is  d is s e r ta t io n  s trong ly  support the 
hypothesis th a t  the E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  is an in te rn a t io n a l  opportunity  cost 
ra te .  As such, the Euro-rate  transmits in te r e s t  ra te  and forward ra te  
v ar ia t io n s  among countries  whenever such changes e i t h e r  a f fe c t  the current  
highest comparable ra te  or replace the form erly  highest ra te .  The transmission  
mechanism i t s e l f  is  in the form o f  competition fo r  funds among, the E u ro -d o lla r  
and other equ iva len t s e c u r i t ie s .
Furthermore, the f ind ings  suggest th a t  the Euro-market has changed 
over time and th a t  the primary cause of th is  change is  r e s t r ic t io n s .  One 
r e s t r ic t io n ,  in p a r t ic u la r ,  can be seen as epitom izing those th a t  cause s h i f ts  
in the E u ro -d o lla r  market: the imposition of reserve requirements on U.S. bank
borrowings. The im position o f  reserve requirements removed most o f  the 
special a t t ra c t ive n e ss  o f  Euro-do llars  as a source o f loanable funds in the 
U.S. Consequently, the monopsonistic nature o f  the E u ro -d o lla r  market 
diminished and the E u ro -d o lla r  alignment with the highest comparable in te r e s t  
ra te  has become more complete.
Given these f in d in g s ,  what w i l l  be the fu tu re  o f Euro-rates and t h e i r  
re la t io n s h ip  to U.S. rates? During 1974, both the Voluntary C red it  R e s tra in t  
program and the In te re s t  Equa liza tion  Tax were revoked. Removal o f  both 
of these re s t r ic t io n s  on c a p ita l  outflows from the U.S. should increase the
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supply o f  E u ro -d o lla rs ,  thereby lowering E uro -do lla r  ra te s .  The reduction  
in  E u ro -d o lla r  ra te s ,  however, should not be seen as a movement toward 
alignment w ith  U.S. rates but ra th e r  as the e f fe c t  of increased Euro-loans  
to the country with the highest comparable in te re s t  ra te s . I f  the demand 
fo r  funds in the country w ith  the highest comparable ra te  is  h igh ly  e la s t i c ,  
Euro-rates w i l l  bearly  dec line  and e i th e r  U.S. rates w i l l  increase or the 
U.S. w i l l  experience continued loss o f short term c ap ita l  funds.
The combination o f the E uro-ra te  as the highest comparable in te r e s t  
ra te  and the removal o f  re s tr ic t io n s  on U.S. outflows should re s u l t  in  increased 
c o rre la t io n  o f U .S .,  E u ro -d o lla r  and fore ign  in te re s t  ra te s .  Is o la t io n  o f  
domestic U.S. monetary p o licy  from i t s  e ffe c ts  on short term c a p ita l  flows 
w i l l  no longer be possib le , and la rg e  c ap ita l  outflows can be pred icted  
whenever equ iva lent U.S. ra tes  are a r t i f i c i a l l y  held below the E u ro -d o lla r  
ra te s .  Consequently, increased f lu c tu a t io n s  in the s ize  of U.S. l i q u id i t y  
balance o f  payments d e f ic i t s  and surpluses can be expected and short term 
cap ita l  flows w i l l  r e f l e c t  in te rn a l  versus external po licy  c o n f l ic t s .
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APPENDIX I
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET
Federal Reserve Regulations
1. Regulation D -  imposes reserve requirements on borrowings from fore ign
banks by U.S. member banks. The requirement o f 10% was established  
October, 1969. This requirement was increased to  20% in 1971 
subsequently has been reduced to 8 %.
2. Regulation M -  re -d e fin es  demand deposits in order to req u ire  U.S.
banks to maintain reserves against fo re ign  bank deposits computed 
on the basis of net balances due from t h e i r  domestic o f f ic e s .
3. Regulation Q -  estab lishes maximum in te r e s t  rates payable by member
banks on various types o f  deposits. C e ilin g  in te re s t  ra tes  were 
suspended on time deposits in  denomination of $1 0 0 , 0 0 0  or made 
fo r  30-89 days in June, 1970.
Voluntary C re d it  R e s tra in t Act o f 1964
R estr ic ted  loans from U.S. banks to fore igners to f ix e d  percentage 
increases over a base year amount. This r e s t r ic t io n  was removed 
January, 1973.
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APPENDIX I I - A  
BASIC DATA FOR REGRESSIONS
Red = E u ro -d o lla r  ra te  
f  s
R^-~s = Foreign Comparable ra te  (same as R^ - Fx)
Rus = U.S. treasury b i l l  ra te
Rf^V = Average fore ign  in te re s t  ra te
f = Average forward ra te
BPS = U.S. Balance o f Payments -  E u ro -d o lla r  money supply approximation
GNP = Average index o f growth in GNP fo r  Germany, Neitherlands and 
F United Kingdom
GNP^g = U.S. gross national product
= Average fore ign money supply
Qg, Qg, 0^ = Quarterly  dummy variab les
Dev = Devaluation speculation (same as SW)
V = Voluntary Cred it  R es tra in t Act
Rev = Revaluation speculation (same as SS)
D = R es tr ic t io n s  on d o l la r  in flows in to  Germany (same as FSR)
Res = Reserve requirements (same as USRR)
Res = R e -d e f in it io n  of demand deposits (same as USD)
Reg. Q = Regulation Q (same as USRQ)
Red R f- :&s Rus
RfSV f-s ^ v  BPS GNPp GNPus
^ 2 Q3 ' 4^ D
V D D D
Req. Q 
Dus
7/64 4 .24 4.11 3.46 4.41 - .5 4  -762 1 0 0 . 0 634.8 8 .5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8/64 4.25 3.87 3.50 4.42 - .4 6  -892 1 0 0 . 0 634.8 16.3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9/64 4 .44 3.87 3.53 4.43 - .6 0  - 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 . 0 634.8 24.3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10/64 4.50 4.09 3.57 4 .40 - . 5 8  -1137 102.3 641.1 31.6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
11/64 5.00 4.19 3.64 4.71 -2 .02 -1253 102.3 641.1 39.1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
12/64 4 .50 4 .10 3 .84 5.69 -2 .02 -1369 102.3 641.1 46.6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/65 4 .50 3 .83 3.81 5.51 - 1 . 9 8 - 9 9 9 104.5 657.6 54.9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2/65 4.56 4 .18 3 .93 5.50 -2 .1 5  -604 104.5 657.6 63.2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3/65 4.81 4 .86 3.93 5.52 -2 .4 0  -185 104.5 657.6 71.7 0 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 0
4/65 4.81 4 .65 3.93 5 .55 - 1 . 6 6  -60 106.4 686.5 80.7 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
5/65 5.25 4 .53 3.89 5 .55 -1 .7 5  +164 106.4 686.5 90.2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
6/65 4.81 4.96 3 .80 5 .08 -1 .1 6  +189 106.4 686.5 99.5 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
7/65 4.63 4.50 3.83 5.12 -1 .51 -210 108.6 704.4 109.0 0 1 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
8/65 4 .44 4.30 3.84 5 .10 -1 .7 9  -608 108.6 704.4 118.3 0 1 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
9/65 4 .94 4.51 3 .92 5 .02 -1 .21 -1006 108.6 704.4 127.3 0 1 0 0 104 0 0 0 0
10/65 5.00 4 .19 4.02 4 .95 - .9 1  -782 1 1 1 . 2 721.2 137.0 0 0 1 0 104 0 0 0 0
11/65 5.31 4.72 4 .08 5.12 - .8 1  -558 1 1 1 . 2 721.2 146.5 0 0 1 0 105 0 0 0 0
12/65 5.31 4 .77 4.37 5.11 - .6 7  -335 1 1 1 . 2 721.2 155.5 0 0 1 0 105 0 0 0 0
1 / 6 6 5 .38 4 .44 4 .58 5 .29 - .5 6  -239 113.1 732.3 164.5 0 0 0 0 105 0 0 0 0
Req. Q
Red R f - ^ l Rus Rf-V f -s a v
s
BPS GNPp GNPus Qg ^3 % D V D D D Dus
2 / 6 6 5.41 4 .60 4.65  5.20 - .7 0 -143 113.1 732.3 173.3 0 0
0 0 106 0 0 0 0
3/66 5.81 5.33 4 .58  5.27 - .6 4 -  47 113.1 732.3 181.8 0 0
0 0 106 0 0 0 0
4/66 5 .78 5.39 4.61 5.25 - .5 8 -  81 115.0 744.6 189.3 1 0
0 0 106 0 0 0 0
5/66 6.09 5.16 4 .63  5.44 - .5 0 -115 115.0 744.6 196.8 1 0 0
0 107 0 0 0 0
6 / 6 6 6.44 5.69 4 .50  5.48 - .5 3 -149 115.0 744.6 204.8  1 0 0
1 107 0 0 0 0
7 / 6 6 6 .84 5.77 4 .78  5.91 ■-1 .09 -331 117.4 748.8  212.1 q 1 0
1 107 0 0 0 0
"8 / 6 6  7 .06 6.19 4 .95  6 .16 - .5 9 -513 117.4 748 .8  218.4  0 1 0
1 138 0 0 0 0
"9/66 7.06 6 .65 5.36 6.20 - .4 7 -695 117.4 748.8  224.7 0 1
0 0 138 0 0 0 0
10/66 7.06 6 . 1 1 5.33  6.21 - .3 8 -619 118.2 762.1 229.5 0 0
1 0 108 0 0 0 0
11/66 7.13 5.63 5.31 6.25 - .3 9 -543 118.2 762.1 234.8 0 0 1
0 109 0 0 0 0
12/56 6.56 5.78 4 .96  6.29 - .4 8 -466 118.2 762.1 240.1 0 0 1
0 109 0 0 0 0
T/67 5.56 5.41 4.72 5.93 - .5 7 -423 118.5 776.3 245.4 0 0 0 0 109
0 0 0 0
2/67 5.69 5.42 4 .56  5.60 - .5 4 -381 118.5 776.3 249.7 0 0 0 0 109 0 0
0 0
3/67 5 .38 5.38 4 .26  5.40 - .6 0 -238 118.5 776.3 254.2 0 0 0 0 109
0 0 0 0
4/67 4 .69 4 .83 3 .84  5 .18 - .8 4 -232 120.1 775.1 259.0  1 0 0 1 109 0
0 0 0
5/67 5.13 4.93 3.60  4.22 - .5 5 -226 120.1 775.1 264.5 0 0 0 1 109 0
0 0 0
6/67 5 .38 5 . 1 2 3.53 4 .90 - .2 9 - 2 2 0 120.1 775.1 269.5 0 0 0 1 109 0
0 0 0
7/67 5.13 4.92 4 .20  5.03 - .4 5 -551 121.3 791.2 275.0 1 1 0 0 109 0
0 0 0
8/67 5.03 4.87 4 .36  4.97 - .5 2 -882 121.3 791.2 280.8  1 1 0 1 109 0 0 0 0
Red R f - ^ l Rus RfSV f - s * v
s
BPS GNPp GNPus MS
''z ^3 %
D V D D D
R
D
9/67 5.78 5.63 4.42 4 .97 - .4 3 - 1 2 1 2 121.3 791.2 286.6 0 1 0 0 109 0 0 0 0
10/67 5 .78 5 .13 4 .55 5.15 -.61 1434 124.0 811.0 293.4 0 0 1 1 109 0 0 0 0
11/67 6.56 6.26 4.72 5.86 - .3 9 -1656 124.0 811.0 300.7 0 0 1 0 109 0 0 1 0
12/67 6.31 6.23 4.96 6 .57 -1 .8 5 -1879 124.0 811.0 308.0 0 0 1 0 109 0 0 0 0
1 / 6 8 5.44 5.33 4.99 6 .55 2 . 1 2 -1342 125.9 831.2 316.0 0 0 0 0 109 0 0 0 0
2 / 6 8 5.66 5.35 4.97 6 .48 2 . 0 0 -805 125.9 831.2 324.0 0 0 0 0 ■109 0 0 0 0
3/68 6 .38 6 .33 5.16 6 .40 -5 .2 7 -267 125.9 831.2 331.3 0 0 0 0 :109 0 0 0 0
4 /68 6 . 6 6 6.30 5.37 6 .46 3.39 -143 127.8 852.9 338.1 1 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0
5/68 7.16 6 .58 5.65 6 .59 5.34 -19 127.8 852.9 344.4 1 0 0 1 108 0 0 0 0
6 / 6 8 6.31 6.26 5.52 6 . 6 6 4.21 105 127.8 852.9 352.2 1 0 0 1 107 0 0 0 0
7/68 6.31 5.90 5.31 6.56 1.60 - 6 6 130.5 871.0 361.0 0 1 0 0 106 0 0 0 0
8 / 6 8 6.16 6.54 5.08 6.41 - 2 . 0 1 -237 130.5 871.0 369.8 0 1 0 0 106 0 0 0 0
9/68 6.25 5.20 5.20 6 .38 -1 .4 8 -408 130.5 871.0 378.1 0 1 0 0 106 0 0 0 0
10/68 6 .59 6.78 5.15 6.06 -.81 -26 134.1 892.5 386.6 0 0 1 1 105 1 0 0 1
11/68 6 .94 7.35 1.25 6.16 -2 .7 5 356 134.1 892.5 396.9 0 0 1 0 104 0 0 1 0
12/68 7.13 7.09 5.94 6.41 -2 .9 5 738 134.1 892.5 405.2 0 0 1 0 104 0 0 1 0
1/69 7.69 7.47 6.13 6 .44 -1 .9 4 69 136.8 908.7 414.0 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
2/69 8.50 7.62 6 . 1 2 6 . 8 8 -1 .9 5 -600 136.8 908.7 421.5 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
3/69 8 .53 7.90 5.90 7.51 - 2 . 1 1 -1268 136.8 908.7 429.5 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
Red R f - ï^
S
Rus Rf^v f - s * ^  BPS 
s
GNPp GNPus MS
F ^ 2 ^3 %
D V D D D
R(
Di
4/69 5 .56 7.72 6 . 2 1 7.39 -2 .4 7  -2117 141.7 924.8 436.8 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
5/69 10.56 9 .48 6 .03 7 .40 -5 .1 7  -2966 141.7 924.8 443.6 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
6/69 10.56 10.60 6.43 7 .57 -2 .3 4  -3816 141.7 924.8 450.6 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 0
7/69 10.44 10.00 6 .98 7.59 -1 .8 0  -3535 144.5 942.8 456.4 0 1 0 1 103 1 0 1 1
8/69 11.31 11.43 6.97 7.64 -6 .11  -3234 144.5 942.8 460.7 0 1 0 1 103 1 0 0 0
9/69 11.25 10.44 7 .18 7 .78 -3 .5 7  -2927 144.5 942.8 464.7 0 1 0 1 103 1 0 0 0
10/69 10.00 9 .12 6 .99 7 .69 -  .73 -1649 147.6 951.7 468.0 0 0 1 0 103 0 0 0 0
11/69 11.00 10.09 7 .24 7 .77 -  .17 -  326 147.6 951.7 473.8 0 0 1 0 103 0 0 0 1
12/69 10.06 10.02 7.81 7.76 -  .30 998 147.6 951.7 479.8 0 0 1 0 103 0 0 0 0
1/70 9 .59 9 .70 8 . 2 0 7.67 -  .28 249 149.5 959.5 485.3 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
2/70 9 .44 9.45 7.13 7 .83 -  .46 -  509 149.5 959.5 489.6 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
3/70 8.63 8.71 6.63 7.61 -  .54 -1250 149.5 959.5 495.4 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
4 /70 8.69 8.62 6 .50 7 .27 -  .28 -1148 151.7 971.1 501.4 1 0 0 0 103 0 1 0 0
5/70 9.19 8 .98 6 .83 7.15 -  .32 -1046 151.7 971.1 506.9 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
6/70 9.06 8 .99 6.97 7.12 -  .09 -  945 151.7 971.1 513.2 1 0 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
7/70 8.50 8.75 6.45 7.02 -  .09 -  856 153.6 985.5 519.5 0 1 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
8 /70 8 . 0 0 8 . 0 2 6.41 7 .08 -  .62 -  767 153.6 985.5 527.3 0 1 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
9/70 8 .50 8 .76 6 . 1 2 6 .98 -  .75 -  679 153.6 985.5 535.1 0 1 0 0 103 0 0 0 0
10/70 7.72 7.41 5.90 6 .93 -  .69 -  755 156.5 989.9 543.9 0 0 1 0 103 0 0 0 0
-8 7 “
APPENDIX I I - B  
INTEREST RATES
Tgjj -  E uro -do llar  ra te  
r^s - U.S. ra te  
r^ -  Highest e f fe c t iv e  ra te  
F = France 
G = Germany 
U.S. = United States  
N = Neitherlands
Sources; Federal Reserve B u l le t in
In te rn a t io n a l Monetary Fund S ta t is t ic s
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Red Rus Rf-FX
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APPENDIX I I - C
SHORT TERM ASSETS AND LIABILITIES VIS-A-VIS NON-RESIDENTS
UK = United Kingdom 
Ger. = Germany 
N either . = Neitherlands  
Fr. = France
Source: Bank fo r  In te rn a t io n a l  Settlements, Annual Report
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SHORT TERM LIABILITIES IN DOLLARS VIS-A-VIS NON-RESIDENTS
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